Chapter 3

The Societal Dimensions of “Human Nature” and the Dynamics of Group Conflict

The preceding chapter was concerned with problemation as the necessary first step in the construction of a theoretical approach to social group interaction and conflict management. The result was an identification of the transformation of the social conflict process to violence as the “most fundamental problem requiring solution.” After identifying the problem, a schematic model was presented to delimit the universe of political inquiry relevant to the problem of political violence. This chapter takes a second step in the construction of a general theory by focusing on the social structure, or context, within which group interaction takes place. A three-dimensional, dynamic process model of social group (society) and inter-group (system) structure is proposed. This chapter, then, is primarily concerned with the delineation of the relevant context for the inquiry, or structuration.

Rather than let the ensuing discussion bog down in an esoteric philosophical debate, I will refer the reader to Alexander Wendt’s exposition on structuration theory in his series of essays on the “agent-structure problem” (1987), “social construction of anarchy” (1992), and “collective identity formation” (1994). Simply put, context matters. (See also, Sherif 1966a; Goertz 1994; Jabri 1996)

“Just as social structures are ontologically dependent and therefore constituted by the practices and self-understandings of agents, the causal powers and interests of those agents, in their turn, are constituted and therefore explained by structures.” (Wendt 1987, 359) Agent and structure are simultaneous interdependent processes that are coterminous in the definition of social context. The agent is gatekeeper between the internal and external realms and an actor in both. Of course, the state is the most prominent form of social agent in the historical record and, so, the present inquiry, but it is still only one of many. I will propose, below, that all social agents are similarly constructed social identity groups and that crucial social structures are generalizable as societal systems.
Wendt’s description of the structuration concept is worth quoting in its entirety:

Structuration theory is an “analytical” rather than “substantive” theory, in the sense that it is about the analysis rather than the substance of the social world. Structuration theory says something about what kinds of entities there are in the social world and how their relationship should be conceptualized, and as such it provides a conceptual framework or meta-theory for thinking about real world social systems, but it does not tell us what particular kinds of agents or what particular kinds of structures to expect in any given concrete social system. Structuration theory, then, does not compete directly with neorealism or world-system theory, but instead with their individualist and structuralist approaches to the agent-structure problem—that is, with their social ontologies. As a social ontology, however, structuration theory does have implications for the potential content of substantive theories about real-world social systems, and for the methodology that social scientists should use to study those systems. (Wendt 1987, 355-56)

The objective of this exercise in structuration theory, then, is to establish the processual mechanics within which the problem of political violence is situated and through which it operates. The conceptual model described below represents an organic-system approach to the development of a fundamental understanding of the basic unit of analysis (or agent): the social identity group; and the internal and external contexts within which the actions of the agent are meaningful (or structure): the societal system. The exposition of the crucial processual dynamics of the “agent-structure” confluence will enable and inform the derivation of testable hypotheses.

The State and Social Identity Groups

There are, at present, no practical modes for the political integration of individuals and groups into polities, or political collectivities, which do not involve either warfare (empire-building) or assimilation (nation-building). Both of these processes involve an essential relationship between an extant state and the individual based on coercion and both have been deemed illegitimate and made obsolete in the “new world order.” On the other hand, the process(es) of nation-building have usually been assumed a priori in political theory and equated with state-building in the Western European literature (thus, the ideal concept of the nation-state). (Cohen and Service 1978) There have been few historical attempts at articulating the dynamics of state-building and how those might pertain to political integrative processes on a grand scale (e.g., at the scale of the modern industrial/service economy), processes which necessarily involve the union of several distinct social groups that are essentially “non-assimilable.”

The concept
Societal Dimensions and the Dynamics of Group Conflict

of “pluralism” provides one contemporary attempt to articulate a potential for political integration on such a grand scale through the recognition of the “common good” defined solely in terms of the state and its conflict management function. (Dahl 1989) The recent renewed interest in the principle of self-determination seems to be based on an ethical preference for voluntary forms of association (popular sovereignty) over the more involuntary forms that are necessarily and primarily held together through coercive means and the agency of the instrumental state (state sovereignty).

“Democratization” is the term generally applied to the political process of transition from the more centralized and autocratic forms of state-centered sovereignty to the more decentralized and participatory forms of popular sovereignty. The available evidence supports the notion of a universal trend toward greater participation in more popular forms of governance but precious little is known about the social dynamics and mechanisms underpinning the movement toward greater democracy. This lack of understanding was never more apparent than during the sudden, dramatic push toward democratic forms in the countries that had comprised the former Socialist Bloc. This rush to popular sovereignty was largely unexpected by the political elites and academics of the already democratic states and caught them largely unprepared to authoritatively guide the aspirations of those democratic novices caught up in the process. Equally illustrative of our flawed comprehension of fundamental social dynamics is the record of our accumulated experience in fostering and guiding democratic transitions by design, rather than in response to demand as happened in the previous example.

The political unification and/or economic coordination of diverse, distinct social identity groups has proven to be both an elusive goal and a problematic reality, however. The same kinds of constraints on political integration which the more advantaged states of the world community have experienced on a macro-scale (e.g., nationalism, the security dilemma, arms races, and pervasive warfare) are also proving to be major obstacles in the process of state-building within the newly-independent polities of the post-colonial world system, preventing them from achieving stable political integration on a micro-scale. The systemic consequences have been protracted conflict, pervasive insecurity, retrogressive disintegration, under-utilization of resources, over-consumption, and “arrested development” (i.e., suboptimality in both welfare and security functions). “Successful” transitions to democratic forms have almost invariably fallen back on the assimilationist model of state-building as multi-ethnic states disintegrate and disaggregate along ethnic identity fissures, often stimulating severe disruptions and dislocations as groups reaggregate in “national” territories and ethnic enclaves.

The intractability of the state-building dilemma is evident in the preeminent schools of international relations theory in the democratic West: Realism and Idealism. Both schools of thought ignore the state-building dilemma by assuming a priori existence of the political state. The state is considered the primary agent
Third World War

in a “development process” of nation-building; nation-building involves the establishment and maintenance of a unitary political identity in support of a unified social order. (Huntington 1969) States are not created equal and are not equally effective; states possess different attributes that determine their relative capabilities. An “invisible hand” of “natural selection” will either eliminate ineffective states (through failure and absorption or conquest by more-effective states) or will motivate them to adopt the proven-effective practices of successful states. (Waltz 1979) The real world, however, appears stuck within a transitional phase wherein the absorption of failed states by successful states is proscribed by Idealist structures of compassion and legality while the guided development of states through the voluntary assimilation of effective and efficient practices (devoid of the pretext of cultural assimilation) is stymied by Realist structures of competitive advantage. The purely voluntary merging of failed states with successful states appears precluded by the subjective interests of both parties under present conditions. What we are left to contend with is the ghetto-ization of the world system. If we are to transcend this impasse, an essential understanding of state-building and system dynamics seems crucial.

Criticisms of Realist and Idealist theories of international relations and security have highlighted the theories’ seemingly contradictory, and certainly incompatible, assumptions of a unitary and uniform human nature. The Realist assumption of man as a self-serving, power-maximizing, calculating actor operating in an anarchical environment of potentially violent aggression stands in stark contrast to Idealist visions of an altruistic, reasoning, and cooperative humankind striving diligently to progress beyond the confines of their own ignorance and parochialism. These equally idealized and stylized images of human nature disable critical thought and severely limit the options recognized as viable in the resolution of crucial social problems: the Realists see no way out of the present mess except to keep the wolves at bay with sticks and fences; the Idealists see a light at the end of the tunnel but have no clear vision of how to get there from here.

Rather than claim that the basic assumptions of both paradigms are wrong, I assert that both are only partially correct and, so, are not inherently contradictory nor necessarily incompatible assumptions. Viewed within the rhetoric of opposition, these visions become competing ideologies; viewed in terms of contrasting perspectives, they become the subjective basis for “triangulating” objective knowledge. As is the case with democracy as a form of state governance, where no one party may legitimately claim to be the sole representative of the democratic ideal or to possess an objective understanding of group interests (social objectivity is necessarily inter-subjective), truly objective knowledge of intrinsically subjective behavior is implausible without a comparative perspective which acknowledges the viability and intrinsic worth of competing perspectives. Thus, social objectivity can be the exclusive domain of no one separately but only all together. Any unitary image can only be a partial presentation of the actual
Societal Dimensions and the Dynamics of Group Conflict

variation in human socio-political dispositions focusing on a specific context of political behavior. The Realist-Idealist debate appears to focus on a differing understanding (perspectives) of relevant context: the Realist paradigm focuses on crisis management situations and the Idealist on non-crisis conflict management techniques.

Yet I know of no prior attempt to explain human political behavior which does not first postulate a unitary human nature and thereby ascribe some sort of uniform behavior, or unitary action, model. Such over-simplification of social complexities go way beyond the ideal standard of parsimony in theoretical constructions. “Everything should be made as simple as possible, but not simpler.” (Albert Einstein, quoted in Goertz 1994, 1) It is a fundamental tenet of the present work that such simplifications of theory often bias analysis toward a certain outcome or perspective and are, thus, often politically or ideologically motivated. Parsimony demands that the most fundamental mechanisms and dynamics of generalizable social processes be identified so that complex systems and processes may be better explained and understood. If Realism and Idealism are to “coexist as equilibria in the same general model” as proposed by Niou and Ordeshook (1994, 211), then both visions of human nature must be equally valid and, therefore, interchangeable or substitutable portions of a more complex whole.

This chapter presents a series of formal, conceptual visualization models of the “social identity group.” The social identity group is proposed to be the basic unit of political analysis. In this conceptualization, the state is viewed as the formal, institutional organization of the polity and the designated actor of that polity. Yet, it is only the “first among equals” in a democratic or polyarchic social system comprised of myriad social identity groups. The state’s actions are significantly restrained endogenously by constitutional and other contractual procedures, prescriptions, and proscriptions. The state’s performance is judged according to its record of compliance with those restraints and the accumulated judgements inform societal perceptions of state legitimacy (cf., the distinction made in chapter 2 between legitimate and structural authority). The state can be more or less institutionalized and the collectivity itself can be greater or lesser in physical and psychological attributes, giving states a very wide range of variance in the measures of their “stateness.” Traditional Western conceptualizations of the political state, however, tend to equate it with its most institutionalized (i.e., ideal) form and often confuse it with other related concepts, such as government, regime, or political elites, thus reinforcing the assumption of monolithic unity and the metaphor of the “unitary actor.” Modern technologies and contending sovereignties are progressively revealing the over-simplification of unitary actor models of human nature, politics, and society. (Walker and Mendlovitz 1990)

Its usage in the international relations and security literature usually confines the term “state” to a certain, small subset of the universe of social identity groups, namely, politically autonomous (sovereign) units, legally recognized. In such units, the state has been enabled and allowed (or simply expected to, as is the case
in the nascent sovereign states of the Third World) to institutionalize group functions and patterns of behavioral interaction, both internally and externally. Analogous political heads, bodies, and arms exist for all social identity groups, yet these are less institutionalized and less autonomous than that special class of state units. States are the primary actors in all political behavior and, especially, in military behavior (as they are the concentration points of military instrumentality). Yet legal states, while qualitatively different from other social identity groups in many aspects, are also very different from each other and, therefore, are not strictly equal nor comparable units for political analysis. What is most important to the present enterprise are the problems arising from the use of traditional conceptions of the state and state behavior in applications and analysis of interactions taking place outside the institutional core of the world system.

The model presented here posits a view of social group identity formation based on an essential assumption of human nature as a four-dimensional continuous variable: 1) *instrumental* (differences in the willingness to use physical force); 2) *sociational* (differences in the facility or faculty to form or orchestrate association); 3) *environmental* (qualities specific to differing physical realities, whether experiential or conditional); and 4) *temporal* (progressive variations due to changing technologies and social learning processes). In short, when viewed from the individual perspective, human nature is not a universal constant but a chaotic social construct. It is only when viewed in the aggregate that human qualities and aspirations gain social form and constancy, that is, through social construction. This proposal is a major departure from conventional theories of political behavior and is, potentially, the present study’s most provocative element and most important contribution.

### Human Nature

Human nature is not uniform manifestation of an ideal type and so cannot be assumed unitary, except in the sense that all humans are created equal as beings of a unitary species with the same existential potential at the point of origination.\(^4\) Arendt (1958, chapter 1) examines “the problem of human nature” as an unanswerable question both in “its individual psychological sense and its general philosophical sense.” All we can hope to know is the “human condition.”

It is highly unlikely that we, who can know, determine, and define the natural essences of all things surrounding us, which we are not, should ever be able to do the same for ourselves...Moreover, nothing entitles us to assume that man \[\text{sic}\] has a nature or essence in the same sense as other things. In other words, if we have a nature or essence, then surely only a god could know and define it, and the first prerequisite would be that he \[\text{sic}\] be able to speak about a “who” as though it were a “what.” The perplexity is that the modes of human cognition
applicable to things with “natural” qualities, including ourselves to the limited extent that we are specimens of the most highly developed species of organic life, fail us when we raise the question: And who are we? This is why attempts to define human nature almost invariably end with some construction of a deity, that is, with the god of the philosophers, who, since Plato, has revealed himself upon closer inspection to be a kind of Platonic ideal of man. Of course, to unmask such philosophic concepts of the divine as conceptualizations of human capabilities and qualities is not a demonstration of, not even an argument for, the non-existence of God; but the fact that attempts to define the nature of man lead so easily into an idea which definitely strikes us as “superhuman” and therefore is identified with the divine may cast suspicion upon the very concept of “human nature.” (Arendt 1958, 10-11; footnote deleted, emphasis in the original)

Using Arendt’s conceptualization of the problem, we might conclude that the operant condition of human existence is the human condition itself, that is, what is unknowable as an object may be best understood by examining its (in this case, social) contextual whole.

Whatever touches or enters into a sustained relationship with human life immediately assumes the character of a condition of human existence. This is why men [sic], no matter what they do, are always conditioned beings. What touches enters the human world of its own accord or is drawn into it by human effort is part of the human condition. (Arendt 1958, 9)

Human beings distinguish themselves and are differentiated by the social context throughout their particular life-cycle and existential reality. Diversity is the result and such diversity is a fundamental quality of the social context and can not be ignored or assumed away without critically disabling comprehension. What is most important in defining the relationship between an individual and its immediate social context is the peculiar combination of existential traits relating to that individual’s strategic options in dealing with its immediate environment. That is, of the four dimensions of social identity formation and construction listed above, at any point in time the temporal dimension is a constant for all individuals and the variation in the environmental dimension is minimal for individuals existing in proximate physical space (i.e., proximate individuals exist in essentially the same physical environment). What, then, is of primary importance in the immediate sense are the peculiar combination of instrumental (physical) and sociational (social psychological) strategies adopted by the individual.

**Instrumental Strategy**

Human nature then is proposed to be an expression of individuality within a two-dimensional continuous matrix. That is, individual humans have intrinsic qualities which dispose them to operate within the confluence of existential reality
(i.e., life experience defined by the exercise of free will) and social context by utilizing some particular combination of instrumental and sociational strategies.\textsuperscript{5} Arendt, in differentiating between “violence” and “power,” captured this essential strategic distinction well. (Arendt 1969; 106, 143-45).\textsuperscript{6} Arendt’s conception of violence is predicated on two important qualities: instrumentation and arbitrariness. Implicit in this conception are an assumed utility of coercion and a willingness to commit an action in violation of some preexisting norm. The instruments used in violence range from a clenched fist to a nuclear arsenal. Arbitrariness alludes to the fact that violence is most effective when it is most unexpected, that is, when the disparity between the strength of an act of violence and any defense which might be mustered to counter that act is greatest.\textsuperscript{7} The idea of “violation” stems from the relational quality of violent action: violence is essentially a unilateral act. Violence is used to effect change in a social relationship which is not accepted or agreed to by at least one the parties involved: the ultimate target or victim of the violence.

Yet physical violence is only the most extreme form of force or coercion. Coercion is an action or the threat of such an action by which it is intended to guide, direct, control, dominate, or eliminate the behavior of some other through the agency of physical force. As previously mentioned, Galtung (1964 1971) has raised the issue of structural violence which is another, lesser form of coercion that does not rely on direct application of physical force. The instruments used in cases of structural violence are institutions and authority structures, which rely on at least a tacit compliance with their directives (without some form of compliance with authority, structural violence transforms to physical violence). A still lesser form of instrumental coercion is the law or social contract, which relies even less on direct force and much more on voluntary compliance. Even more subtle forms of coercion are organizational ties of ordination and personal bonds such as jealousy, love, and affection. Even the fear of God or the abiding respect for legal principles contain an measure of instrumental coercion that is enforced through the psychic agency of self and conscience. All forms of coercion operate in the social milieu and are instrumental in defining social relationships and individual behavior. As such, instrumental coercion is better conceived as a continuous variable with magnitude ranging from the most subtle, compliance norms through structural authority through psychological threat and abuse through structural violence and on to the most extreme forms of physical violence.\textsuperscript{8}

Acts of violence and other forms of instrumental coercion are necessarily premeditated; this assertion derives from their instrumental component. Instruments are created with their end use in mind; they are not naturally occurring objects (although, in their crudest form, they may be fashioned from such objects such as a rock or a sharp stick). The act of operating an instrument requires forethought and intent, if only to the extent of picking that instrument up or closing one’s fist and striking out with it. Therefore, the psychology of instrumentality, that is, the
disposition to use such an instrument in an act of coercion, becomes crucial and definitive in the social context.

In order to lessen confusion over terminology, this expanded conception of violence as an individual’s psychological disposition to use instrumental coercion will be referred to as that individual’s instrumental coercion index or their *optimal instrumental strategy*. That index may be thought of as a measure of the most extreme form of instrumental coercion that person is willing to contemplate initiating in a social situation. Implicit in this understanding is the assumption that, at any point in time, the individual is willing to justify all forms of coercion of lesser magnitude than that represented by their personal index; they will not embrace the utility of greater magnitudes of force. Also implicit is the idea that all acts of coercion are circumstantial and, therefore, their actual occurrence is probabilistic in the sense that they are triggered by events largely outside the control of the person(s) affected, whereas the disposition to use coercion is relatively and relationally constant (i.e., individual dispositions change over the long-term but are relatively fixed over the short-term). Relationally, although individual dispositions change, especially as a function of age, those changes are statistically neutralized in the aggregate such that the aggregate mix remains fixed. The societal aggregation of individual dispositions to rationalize instrumental action can be considered *societal capacitance*: the willingness to use political force. Such capacitance is the social psychological complement to the general availability of the resources and instruments of force: *societal capability*.

Instrumental strategies involve the use of force to alter a situation to an individual agent’s particular benefit. Another way to explain this essential quality of coercion is to examine Dahl’s (1957, 202-03) classic definition of power: “A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do.” As such, an instrumental act necessarily alters the situation of some other individual(s) and, in so doing, creates a dualism of actor and target. Thus, there are two aspects to instrumentality: *active* and *reactive*. Active instrumental behavior is an action motivated through a rationale of self-promotion; reactive behavior is an equivalent (re)action motivated through a rationale of self-protection or vindication of perceived structural injustices.

It will be helpful here to refer to a conceptual visualization scheme of the argument presented thus far. Figure 3.1 will be immediately recognizable as a “normal distribution” or Gauss curve and is mathematically derived from the *Central Limit Theorem*. This is the basic statistical model of expected variation in a large population of cases measured on a continuous, one-dimensional attribute, known generally as *R methodology*. It is also the basic model for distributions of single-issue, political subjectivity qualities of individuals operating in a unitary social context, commonly referred to as *Q methodology*. (Cf., Brown 1980 1986) The derivation of the complete social identity model combines elements of both objectivity and subjectivity, as does the social context.
R methodology generalizes to any situation in which measurement is independent of the individual’s self-reference. Q methodology, by way of contrast, operates within the ‘internal’ frame of reference, not in the sense of a metaphysical subjectivism accessible only to introspection, but in the thoroughly empirical sense of subjective communicability, of the world...as it is experienced from ‘my own point of view.’ (Brown 1986, 57; citation omitted)

The first step in the conceptualization of social identity is to model political attitudes along essential social attributes within a social identity group context. In the interests of conceptual simplicity, Figure 3.1 simply posits a normal distribution of such attitudes along a continual measure of instrumental proclivities, ranging from high active strategic instrumentality to high reactive strategic instrumentality. The central tendency of the distribution conflates with the group identity or societal norm, that is, the preference for no use of coercion against group members. The primacy of this non-use preference is essential for group cohesion and coherence: most individuals will not choose to identify with a group that wishes them harm. The y axis in Figure 3.1 merely measures the number (n) of individuals that can be expected to ascribe to the indexed preference for within-group instrumental coercion.
Societal Dimensions and the Dynamics of Group Conflict

Sociational Strategy

The second dimensional quality of social group identity stands in existential opposition to the disposition to justify and utilize instrumental strategies. Again, I will begin by referring to Arendt’s conceptualization of power and violence. Arendt’s conception of power counterpoises the conventional use of the term in Western political science literature, in which power is associated with actual and potential military capability (i.e., the capability and capacity to utilize violence). According to Arendt, “Power corresponds to the human ability not just to act but to act in concert. Power is never the property of an individual; it belongs to a group.” (Arendt 1969/1972, 143) Implicit in this conception is the idea that the larger the number of individuals and the more concerted are their actions within the group, the greater the power of that group (assuming constant technology). Also implicit is the fundamental need for multi-faceted cooperation in social relationships, at least, those within the group. Thus, Arendt’s conception of power refers to the productive capabilities of a group enabled by the efficaciousness of their cooperative and coordinated association and their capacity for reaching sound, multilateral, and mutually-advantageous decisions to guide behavior. The formation of individuals into a social group is not a chance event; such societal organization requires pre-mediation and directed action in the establishment of associational linkages. Thus, it is also valid to speak about a psychological disposition in an individual to form associational ties as a strategy both of goal-directedness and conflict management. To avoid unnecessary confusion (association may be considered a form of psychic instrumentality to direct relatively non-coercive physical instrumentalities), this expanded conception of Arendt’s idea of power is referred to as the individual’s optimal sociational strategy and its measure will be an index of societal identification.

Sociational strategies look to the formation of social interaction linkages as a mechanism for accomplishing individual ends in common or in concert. These are the basis of what Simmel (1908) terms “sociation” in the integration dynamics of individual consciousness and what Sherif (1967) terms “superordinate goals” in the integration dynamics of social group psychology.10 In opposition to sociation are coercive strategies that preference individualization over sociation. Sociational strategies are essentially cooperative, rather than coercive, and integrative, rather than disintegrating or fragmenting. Sociational strategies, because they are inclusive and subsume both conflicting (and potentially contending) parties in a concerted, or supraordinate, action in response to the issue of conflict, do not create dualisms as do instrumental strategies but, rather, they create unities. This unifying dynamic is designated proactive, in contrast to the active and reactive dualisms created by the use of instrumental strategies.
A second step in the conceptual derivation of a social identity group model, then, is to model the relationship between the essential social attributes within the social identity context. Figure 3.2 presents a simple production-possibility curve.

Recall that for a given technology and a given amount of physical and human resources, the production-possibility curve portrays the maximum attainable output combinations of any two commodities [in this case, instrumental and sociational capabilities] when all resources are fully and efficiently employed. (Todaro 1985, 109)

A straight trade-off in production capabilities for the two social-strategic commodities is represented by the straight line in the diagram. For various reasons, it is feasible to claim that the production frontier is not a straight line but rather a true curve. That curve reflects production inefficiencies at greater concentrations of instrumental production (the individuation of instrumentalism loses the efficiencies attributable to sociation, social learning, and economies of scale) and greater production efficiencies associated (for the opposite reason) with greater concentrations of sociationism. The resulting curve approximates (one-half

**Human Possibilities and Social Forms**

Figure 3.2 Human Possibilities Model
of) the Gauss-curve displayed in Figure 3.1. This possibilities frontier is also applicable to the other half of the instrumental dualism (Figure 3.2 portrays only the “active” part of the dualism). The combined curves of the two halves of the instrumental dualism is an approximation of the Gauss-curve.

Figure 3.3 presents an application of the theoretic postulations advanced so far. The conceptual space of Figure 3.3 is defined by the two dimensional axes described above: the $x$ axis is a continuous variable, Instrumental Strategy, ranging from “none” to “most extreme;” the $y$ axis is also a continuous variable, Sociational Strategy, ranging from “self” (no sociation) to “global” (total, or complete, sociation). It is theorized that all possible human political dispositions fall within this conceptual space and may be individually plotted. Yet, not all potential combinations of two-dimensional values are existentially possible in a societal context. Possible values along the $y$-axis are constrained by the societal context itself, that is, by the extent of societal development of the particular group in question (see discussion below). Possible values along the $x$-axis are similarly constrained by the extent of societal development such that the greater the value of $y$, the lesser the value of $x$, and vice versa. Values along the $x$-axis are also constrained by the nature of coercive strategies, that is, they are antithetical to the sociation function; they do not unify, they separate. (The labels along the axes are meant to be suggestive rather than definitive as even our understanding of the meaning of these terms is culturally or contextually dependent, i.e., the meaning of these terms is relative.) The maximum value sets along the two dimensions are represented as the possibilities-curve; all possible sets of individual dispositional qualities within a given social identity group fall along or within the possibilities curve.

The points labeled W and Z are provided by way of illustration. Person of dispositional index W may be thought of as an individual who essentially values only the self (i.e., extremely self-centered) and is willing to consider and rationalize very violent behavior in pursuit of supposed self-interest within the group (i.e., sociopathic behavior). Z, on the other hand, values an ethnic identity and is willing to use all available institutional means to protect his group. As long as the goals of the larger identity group and Z’s more parochial interests are compatible, Z will continue to support the larger identity; should those values come into contention, such as a group attempt to limit ethnic expression, Z will prefer her more local identity to the more remote identity of the larger group. Such individual behavior will most often fall within the shaded rectangle due to the principle of self-conservation by which violent actions will be often threatened but rarely performed except under exceptional conditions. As such, the indexed disposition measures the individual’s capacittance for instrumental force. That capacittance may be triggered partially, incrementally, or totally by contextual circumstances. Once the individual has transgressed the “bounds of civility” imposed by the principle of self-conservation (dictated by desire for self-preservation within the social context), that individual will be required to maintain
a credible threat or escalate their behavior to more extreme instrumental modes in order to preserve the utility of those actions and the individual’s autonomy within the societal system; the system is, of course, obligated to counteract and correct such behavior, a situation of social tension. A social implication of the concept of instrumental capacitance is that latent individual capacitance may be singularly or collectively triggered by events or changes in general circumstances; also possible are contagion or demonstration effects (the actions of one individual provides a trigger for subsequent actions by others) and diffusion effects (the actions of triggered individual capacitance alter general environmental conditions in such ways that subsequent triggers occur more regularly or frequently).

What cannot be accurately portrayed are the associational ties themselves; these are the energy bonds that hold individuals together in organizational networks and provide (and are maintained by the volume of exchange along) stable avenues of societal communication. These individual ties and the aggregate network provide the structure of the social identity group and the mechanism for political action and systemic change. They literally “glue” the pieces together into the whole. It is the maintenance of these ties and networks that define the health of the group and it is the breakdown of these ties that lead inexorably to its failure.

The third and final step, then, is to combine the instrumental dualisms into a singular model. The Gauss-curve provides the form for the proposed model of
the social identity group measured in two-dimensional conceptual space. It must be reiterated that the proposed model is fully two-dimensional, unlike the single-attribution (one-dimensional) “normal distribution” model. Because it is two-dimensional, it has both form and substance. The production-possibilities curve represents the fullest and most efficient production of the combined human social qualities and so individuals who attain such existential “perfection” may be considered to be an individualist elite or natural elite. Most individuals will fall short of the ideal and so will be situated, and plotted, inside the possibilities-curve. Similar to the one-dimensional theorem, the social forms model of the social identity group is assumed to attain normalcy with a sufficiently large $n$, or number of individual cases. Normalcy in this two-dimensional theorem means that all possible individual types are filled by individual cases (and, of course, adequately bonded together). The positioning of any particular individual within the model is a complex combination of individual nature, social nurture, and free will. As such, from an individualist perspective, the social identity group is a chaotic system of continual movement and the unpredictability of particular cases (the temporal course of any individual case, of course, is somewhat predictable and becomes increasingly predictable over time). From a systems perspective, the social identity of the group is a stable attractor for chaotic behavior; the individual cases are attracted to the societal norm that defines and distinguishes the group. The ongoing fact of group viability, coherence and cohesion, requires a stable social form; the organizing principle of the social identity group, in service to the group’s raison d’être, socially constructs and reproduces the social form. It must, finally, be emphasized that the individual attitudes so constructed are group-relative and group-relevant; the individual may display quite different group attitudes and position in its simultaneous or subsequent identification with (an)other group(s).

Social identity groups are neither totally independent entities nor perfectly exclusive; they are open systems, they are comprised of open systems, and are a unit in larger open systems. The closure of social group identity is a contingent condition. There are many sizes of social groups and step levels of psychological dispositions in basically ascriptive political associations which may be considered to distinguish magnitudes of abstract societal identifications and corresponding types of social identity groups. The broadest social identification would be the global level (e.g., the United Nations—group perspective—or world citizen—individual perspective); a step down would be a regional federation, union, or community (e.g., the United States, Soviet Union, or European Community); another step down would be a local federation, union, or community (e.g., former Yugoslavia, Pakistan, Canada, Indonesia); another step down would be the nation (e.g., Turkey, Portugal, Poland); another might be an ethnic grouping (e.g., Kurds, Pushtuns, Eritreans, Scots); narrower still would be tribes, clans, and families. Other types of groups which are less ascriptive and more choice or achievement-oriented are political ideology groups, interest groups,
professional groups, recreational groups, gangs, etc. These groups often act politically in ways similar to those I have called social identity groups, although they lack the strong physical/spatial/temporal component (e.g., identification with territory and cultural markers, supposed genetic “blood line,” and essential self-reproduction) and rely more heavily on performance expectations as the basis for group cohesion. Yet these identity markers retain their importance to group distinction and, so, artificial markers are created in the form of special attire, badges, or even greetings and salutes. One familiar metaphor for this step level political identification concept is the Russian matyushka doll: the series of dolls of decreasing size that are nested one inside another, from the largest down to the tiniest possible.

The social forms model of the social identity group provides a general model of social self-organization within which all political perspectives can be included. Inclusive models are rare in political science but necessary in the rapidly evolving context of the democratization and globalization (“cascading openness”) of political relations. The social forms model allows a conceptual space within which all ideologies “can coexist as equilibria in the same general model.” (Niou and Ordeshook 1994, 211) This theme will be further elaborated in the following sections.

Sociation

Having briefly explained the individualist foundation of the social identity group, it is time to shift the focus and vantage point away from the individual to the societal entity. Figure 3.4 presents a model of the societal aggregation of individual dispositions toward within-group relationships. It is a model of political inter-subjectivity in a two-dimensional space defined by the two strategic aspects of human nature, instrumental and sociational, and their intrinsic social qualities of unity and dualism. The model is a generalized statistical-probability distribution of individual types applicable to any viable social identity group. The x-axis is a relational measure of the strength of force an individual would be willing to bring to bear in the resolution of a perceived contention within the group; the y-axis is a measure of the magnitude of identification with the social group in relation to the self. Full empirical justification of this model of the “aggregate social individual” remains to future research; for present purposes, the model is provided as a theoretical assumption of the basic analytic unit necessary for explicating human nature in a social (societal and systemic) context.

The social identity group model of human society may be conceived as an “aggregate individual,” an organic being that is defined by the parameters of the societal possibilities curve which, in turn, are defined by the available level of technology. As posited above, behavior resulting from dispositions defined by the
Active societal sector create, as the existential consequence of instrumental dualism, their “mirror reflection” in the Reactive sector. The inherent opposition of the Active and Reactive sectors creates the interactive tension which is the stimulus for the sociation function that results in the Proactive response to conflict in social dilemmas (see Simmel 1908b/1971 and Coser 1956). The maximal set values in this conceptualization, defined as the possibilities-curve, may be thought of as the society’s Natural Elite, that is, those individual group members who have developed the optimal combination of strategic qualities in individualistic terms. In societal terms, however, the relevant elite is defined by those individuals who have developed the optimal combinations of sociational qualities (i.e., the subgroup designated the Societal Elite in Figure 3.4). This subgroup forms the proto-state of the social identity group and its optimal agent.

Individuals are attracted to the Societal Norm and so cluster around this “central tendency” which is schematically defined as the point R0 or “Relative Zero” (that is, zero on the instrumental attribute, the ideal, apposite refuge from the Hobbesian “state of nature”). The viability of a social identity group is predicated on the existence of a societal core of individuals who recognize the primacy of the normative identity in the pursuit of common and collective goals and, so, promote sociational function and impede instrumental affect in the societal context. The society is held together through a complex structure of inter-
personal (dyadic) linkages and associational ties between individuals, at the simplest level, and various group aggregations or networks, at the more complex levels; these ties and networks are more or less formalized (Simmel 1956 has termed this social network the “web of group-affiliations”; cf., Tilly 1985). A society reproduces itself by institutionalizing many of these associational linkages and webs, thus providing an infrastructure of communication channels and societal roles to be filled by future generations.

An important feature of this model is contained in the leadership function implied by the sub-group concept of the societal elite or proto-state, that is, an extensive (rather than exclusive) political elite comprising competing societal elites; see Figure 3.5 below. This group leadership concept stands in contrast to the conventional unitary actor assumption in political analysis. Following Arendt’s argument in The Origins of Totalitarianism (1973), this model posits that there are competing societal elites with contrasting perspectives and political priorities who are likely to gain preeminence within the system under special and specifiable environmental or contextual conditions: the Active societal elite position will be preeminent (and be opposed by the Reactive societal elite) under conditions of systemic threat and crisis wherein the society (and the state) has the power capabilities to promote its particular societal or “national” interests (i.e., positive expected utility); the Reactive societal elite will be preeminent in a perceived threat or crisis situation when the society’s capabilities to actively promote itself are uncertain, undervalued, underdeveloped, or consciously restrained (protective action is less costly and less risky than promotional action); the Proactive societal elite will be preeminent under non-crisis conditions (and be duly criticized by both Active and Reactive elites). Both exogenous and endogenous factors influence the perception of systemic condition and the degree of threat or crisis. Some exogenous threats are highly visible and certain, such as Nazi Germany’s attack on Poland, whereas others are opaque and largely imagined, such as the Cold War. Likewise, some endogenous threats are largely fabricated for political purposes, such as the Soviet terror campaign against the kulaks and counter-revolutionaries in the 1930s and the U.S. “red scare” of the 1950s, and others menacingly real, such as the ANC and Inkatha movements against apartheid in South Africa.

Figure 3.5 presents a graphic depiction of the “competing elites” proposition. In the diagram, a potential leader with the political subjectivity characteristics at point a (i.e., Active societal elite; a political perspective consistent with Realism) would be willing to bring strength of coercion $a \times r_0^x$ to bear in promoting the particular group interests of $a \times v$ level of association in the solution of an endogenous political contention (and strength $a \times R_0 x$ in an exogenous contention), a position countered by $r$ (i.e., the Reactive elite; a position consistent with Socialism), who would only be willing to apply such a degree of instrumental force $r \times x$ in protecting the group identity from usurpation by sub-group identities or $R_0 x-rt$ in protecting against encroachments by external groups. Both a and $r$
Societal Dimensions and the Dynamics of Group Conflict

Figure 3.5 Competing Elites Model

may be thought of as political introverts (or politically introspective) in that, under conflict conditions, they both prefer exclusive identification with the group over any association with equivalent “other” groups or a subordinate group-status within a supraordinate group (i.e., ay and ry are group-exclusive sociation). In contrast, position p (i.e., Proactive societal elite; consistent with the Idealist perspective) would see the group’s interests as better served through a cooperative or coordinated action at a higher level of association (e.g., working with the contending actor on a multilateral resolution of the contention, possibly through the agency of an intermediary, supraordinate group); p would be willing to bring very little coercion to bear in the resolution of an endogenous crisis because such an instrumental action would directly contradict their higher order associational values (p may still be willing to promote or tolerate the use of coercion with other groups depending on the relational value of R0x—inter-group dynamics will be discussed more fully later in this chapter).19

Figure 3.5, then, graphically depicts the capacity of the social identity group model to provide for the “coexisting equilibria” of competing political ideologies espoused by Niou and Ordeshook (1994). The leadership of a or r may result either from a change in the conditions affecting the group, that is, a temporal systemic crisis which causes a corresponding temporal shift in the normative expectations of the group (i.e., away from R0 toward either ax or rx) or from a competing elite’s
manipulation of general perceptions of threat or crisis (i.e., a shift in R0x). In the former case the special leadership is a reflection of the public mood and in the latter case the public mood is a reflection of the interests of a particular elite’s leadership. The range of potential normative deviation from the societal norm ranging from ax to rx may be thought of as the society’s latitude or zone of legitimacy. In a normally operating (developed) societal system in a secure environment, normative expectations will fluctuate within this zone but will tend toward an equilibrium at R0 (and the leadership preeminence of the Proactive perspective). Should a temporal shift away from the societal norm be of substantial duration, the societal norm will tend to change to concur with the changed expectations. This tendency will manifest either as an alteration in the group’s normative identity (i.e., an absolute change in the instrumental strategy of the group toward the exogenous environment, for example, toward greater militancy) or as a polarization within the group and the establishment of alternative societal norms and an eventual bifurcation of social identity into competing groups or some mixture of the two processes (as happened during the prolonged Vietnam crisis in the United States).

Important in this regard is the idea of alternative elites. Societies, especially in the early stages of development, are not tightly cohesive identity groups; they are better thought of as “loose” identity groups. In such a situation where the distribution of individuals does not cluster so tightly around the societal norm (i.e., there is a greater standard deviation within the group identity) the degree of deviation from the norm renders the social identification dynamic less stable or even unstable. The greater the standard deviation within society, the more
susceptible the identity is to disintegration, bifurcation, or separation. In such case, the Natural Elite stand as potential focal points for the articulation of alternative group norms and the concomitant formation of splinter group identities such as class divisions.

Figure 3.6 presents the conceptual model of a society riven by class divisions, a social situation common in European development processes. The articulation of a rationale of aristocratic privilege (i.e., the privileged class norm, R0a) enabled the active societal elements of a diverse collection of lower order (feudal) groups to coalesce within a higher order sociation which rationalized the use of force to control the broader social group consisting of two “inferior” class elements: the exploited class of slaves, peasants, and laborers (reactive group norm, R0r) and the latent proactive, or middle-class, group of freemen, artisans, traders, and entrepreneurs (R0p). Although the class model (as a generalized example of societal fragmentation) is most often associated with a primordial or underdeveloped stage of social development (e.g., Marxian historical materialism), a similar fragmentation of society may occur as a result of the active or reactive sector receiving modern armaments from abroad and thus gaining predominant structural authority over society (e.g., predatory regimes) or it may recur as a result of a marked deterioration in the conditions of a society and a breakdown of social identity (i.e., state failure). Identity group separatism or secessionism also involves issues of discrimination or “distributive justice.”

**Societal Development**

The fundamental assumption that accounts for the generation of group formation processes is the social nature of human beings: sociation is the preferential strategy. As such, all societies are essentially open systems and are, at least potentially, organized from the smallest aggregation of individuals to the greatest aggregation, the global society. The lack of salience and viability of higher order aggregations, at any point in time, is a primarily a function of technology (or the lack thereof): the knowledge, capability, and the will to associate successfully at greater levels has not yet been fully realized. Yet, this potential to sociate remains conditional; individuals do not blindly accept authority nor will they unconditionally surrender their individuality. The viable society will make accommodations to individuality and identity such that dispositional identities are not threatened but, rather, are seen to complement, and be complemented by, the more practical concerns of economy and organization. Both Simmel and Kant have argued that increasing levels of inter-societal interaction produces increasing conflict and, in lieu of successful conflict management procedures and institutions, breed greater systemic (i.e., inter-group) and societal (intra-group) tensions which tend to erupt in greater incidence of violence, generally. This tension does not lead
inexorably to violence, however. Social tension coupled with the knowledge of the possibility of violence provide the impetus to innovate associations at greater levels of societal aggregation, to adapt existing societal structures to fit within the systemic structure innovations, and to better perform the conflict management function. (E.g., Coser 1956; Huntley 1996) From a systemic perspective, evolutionary social dynamics tend to produce step-level innovations in political structures with each new super-structure integrating lesser, extant structures but not necessarily obviating or supplanting their functional value (i.e., total absorption and assimilation of “primordial” social structures is a sufficient but not a necessary method). From the societal perspective, structural development processes are the manifestation of the group’s raison d’être as they increase group performance and consequently increase security and material well-being.

Figure 3.7 applies the principles of the social identity group model to a dynamic conceptualization of the societal development process. The theoretic postulations of the model are straightforward: societal development is defined as a movement or change in societal relations toward a maximal reliance on associative linkages and non-violent conflict management strategies and a minimal reliance on instrumental coercion and crisis management strategies. This perspective is consistent with Deutsch’s (1961) social mobilization theory of political development, Schumpeter’s (1911) entrepreneurial theory of economic
development, and Dahl’s (1989) explanation of the primary role of conflict management in the development of “polyarchy” but contrasts significantly with many other prominent theories of political development (e.g., Huntington 1968) and economic development (e.g., Marxism or Rostow 1960). Most importantly, it is consistent with theories of liberal democracy and democratization processes. This conceptualization distinctly emphasizes the efficacy of conflict management techniques over social control mechanisms in the process of societal development.

Lesser developed societies are prone to higher probabilities of greater instrumental force being used in the resolution of conflicts, by definition. The primary implication of this conceptualization of development argues against the idea of the “national security state” as that formulation of authority and social control presents a severe structural impediment to necessary social change (rather than being an expedient as claimed by Huntington). It also argues against revolution as that formulation initiates a retrogressive process leading to an unwarranted destructuration and desociation of society (by destroying the evolved network of associative linkages) and, thus, stimulating the need for greater structural authority in its wake. Both these radical prescriptions for social engineering emphasize instrumental strategies, either directly or indirectly, to the obvious detriment and contradiction of the necessary change toward more and greater sociational strategies (see Chorover 1979). Neither can provide the sociational impetus to overcome the problem of political violence in underdeveloped societies as both are primarily dependent on such violence for maintaining their mainly instrumental authority in the absence of legitimate authority. Because there is a broader range of instrumental dispositions than sociational dispositions in conditions of lesser development there is a very real problem of how to maintain proactive societal elite control over the state institutions of coercion (i.e., the concept of civilian control of the professional military; putting the command of instrumental authority in the hands of those who are less disposed and therefore least likely to use such force and who also most highly value the society itself). The state institutions of coercion tend to be controlled by the active elites and opposed by the reactive elites; it is only in the well-developed society that coercion is normatively deemphasized, practically minimized, professionally institutionalized, and under the stable direction of the proactive proto-state.

When instrumental resources such as weaponry and technical training in coercive methods are provided by exogenous sources, the society’s proactive norm loses its salience and attraction as the ultimate source of instrumental resources (i.e., as director of societal power production) and thereby loses institutional and political control over the utilization of instrumental strategies within society. If only the active subgrouping is thus exogenously supplied, the result is likely to be characterized by a national security state, a predatory elite, and protracted authoritarian rule. If both the active and reactive subgroupings are exogenously, instrumentally supplied (as has often happened during the Cold War), the result...
Third World War

is most likely a condition of protracted civil warfare in which both instrumental sectors tend to prey upon and otherwise victimize the proactive center (i.e., the sector that embodies the societal capacity to produce material goods and remains unwilling to employ violence either to promote or protect itself and its material welfare). This artificial condition closely approximates the class divisions that characterized nineteenth century Europe and may help to explain why the rhetoric of Marxism held great appeal here despite its obvious theoretical inappropriateness. Because it is the proactive sector that drives or guides societal development, either of these exogenous, instrumental interferences exacerbates violent societal conflict and, thus, seriously impedes the process of societal development. Because the proactive sector is effectively prevented from developing advanced associational linkages due to the impedance of violent and coercive conflict, the commodities it is capable of producing tend to remain simple, primary products which require minimal association and technical coordination and so minimal risk and investment. This conflict explanation of the underdevelopment syndrome contrasts with neo-Marxist, dependencia, and other underdevelopment arguments (e.g., Frank 1969). The idea of a crucial conflict-development nexus will be examined in more detail below.

A second important theoretic implication of this conceptualization of development is that development is neither necessarily a linear, uniform, nor irreversible process; the potential for societal retrogression (or “backsliding”) and disintegration is an inherent potentiality and ever-present quality of the myriad, fragile, and vulnerable associational linkages that comprise complex, modern societies, a vulnerability made even more salient by the ever-present and always strong, intuitive, and emotive appeal of unilateral, instrumental strategies.

There are six problematic aspects of the societal development dynamic process that, together, determine the rate of developmental progression (or retrogression) and thus deserve special attention and consideration: crisis, atrophy, conflict management, socialization, sociopathic activity, and associative linkage (associational ties and interaction density).

Problems of Societal Development

Figure 3.8 illustrates the six fundamental problems of societal development proposed here; two are potentially disintegrating dynamics: crisis and atrophy, and two are potentially integrative forces: conflict management and socialization. In addition, two crucial “societal mechanisms” are discussed: sociopathic activity and associative linkages. Each of the six are described below.

Crisis

The symbol C in Figure 3.8 refers to the effects of the perception of pervasive societal or systemic threat and crisis on social identity group developmental
dynamics: the Proactive elite position tends to give way to the more instrumental elite positions, Active and Reactive. The nature of systemic crisis is such that the Proactive position must appear inadequate, ineffective, or inconsequential, either because of the appearance of a new societal or systemic condition which cannot be accommodated within the existing structure or because of a failure of leadership in responding successfully to (or anticipating) crucial conditions. This perception of crisis, as mentioned, is not necessarily disintegrative; it may stimulate production and innovation (consider the “rally round the flag” effect wherein the perception of crisis stimulates group cohesion, Stohl 1980; Levy 1989, or the “phoenix effect” already mentioned). Should the perception of crisis persist over the long-term, however, and especially if the nature of the crisis is strong, unclear, or uncertain (i.e., a crisis of identity or consensus), the society will tend to polarize into Active and Reactive sub-groupings leaving the Proactive position stranded and unable to effectively control the use of instrumental strategies either by or within society (Russett and Graham 1989 and Lian and Oneal 1993 both assert that the initially positive endogenous effect of exogenous threat, i.e., the “rally-round-the-flag” effect, tends to be reversed over the longer-term to a net negative societal influence).

In this regard, two situations are especially problematic. First, whereas a Reactive position can easily be justified as responding to clearly visible attack
(thereby invoking claims of self-defense and placing responsibility for the situation in some exogenous source), an Active position is likely to be held accountable and responsible for its initiation of provocative, offensive, or aggressive action. In order to claim or retain legitimate authority, the active initiation of a unilateral, coercive action must be justified in terms of the existence of a perceived threat that is indisputably "real." It is very difficult, if not impossible, to establish universally compelling evidence of a soon-to-be-realized aggressive intent in ambiguous situations of complex social tensions and even more problematic to claim the existence of a vital threat that demands strong anticipatory "response" (i.e., Active coercion tends to be much more divisive than Reactive coercion as it is particularly hard to distinguish that form of "anticipatory self-defense" from pure aggression, thus, separating believers from non-believers, supporters from detractors). Second, the initiation of violent and coercive action in a social relationship is always divisive as the casting of the enemy image separates the antagonists and divides opinion.

It is the foundational assertion of this study that instrumental coercion is the antithesis of sociation and that political violence is the dynamic of dissociation and, so, the "fundamental problem" of sociation and development processes. Violence irrevocably violates the physical or psychological integrity of some person or group and some preexisting social norm or expectation. Control of the use of violence within society or between societies is the primary duty and responsibility of the state apparatus; the occurrence of violence necessarily involves the complicity of the political state and societal proto-state, whether directly or indirectly. No state can avoid responsibility for the occurrence of political violence within its juridical boundaries. The experience of violence fundamentally undercuts and erodes the societal foundations of state legitimacy and authority, resulting in increased political cynicism. It is the cessation of violence that holds claim to universal merit and it is only when political violence is used defensively to forcibly impose a cessation to violence that its use can be justified in societal terms. "Violence can be justifiable, but it will never be legitimate." (Arendt 1969, 151)

**Atrophy**

The symbol A in the diagram refers to the effects of atrophy. Because a human society is an organic construction or living system, it is perishable and will tend to deteriorate, disintegrate, or breakdown of its own accord. Associational ties require continuous, conscious effort to create and maintain and will wither away if not continually, actively cultivated. Simple neglect of the societal network is the main problem of societal atrophy, as it results "naturally" from simple inactivity (the rationale and motivation for a continuing expenditure on structural maintenance becomes unclear and less compelling in situations lacking immediacy). Crisis and atrophy are symbiotic conditions. The condition of crisis, while contributing generally to situational immediacy, contributes an increased
impetus to the process of atrophy as the demands of crisis management are an overly consumptive and highly inefficient societal activity (i.e., the condition of crisis justifies the diversion of essential resources away from system maintenance activities to relatively unproductive security activities) and because its presence as a condition tends to justify or rationalize a general preference for instrumental strategies (stimulating the production of societal dualisms, disunities, and challenges—taken together these conditions constitute an “insecurity dilemma,” see Job 1992a 1992b). Increases in general atrophy tend to increase societal perceptions of vulnerability and insecurity, thus, focusing and accentuating (or exaggerating) attention to the possibilities of threat and crisis. Increasing reliance on instrumental strategies decreases the perceived salience of sociational strategies and negatively affects the structure of associational ties (i.e., decreases their diversity, number, and strength). The process of societal atrophy increases the degree of entropy (disorder) in the societal system.24 Metaphorically speaking, the combined effects of crisis and atrophy are a societal vortex: an inherent tendency toward a spiraling insecurity dilemma and acute loss of rational control.

Conflict Management

The M in Figure 3.8 signifies the operative technology and functional mechanisms of conflict management available to societal administration that are successfully utilized in societal relations. Conflict management is the primary function and societal responsibility of the political state (i.e., the proto-state) but the well-developed society will empower and obligate all members to participation and contribution in this complex function. The objective of the conflict management function is to minimize total societal deviation from the societal relational norm (i.e., minimize dispositional values along the instrumental x-axis). Increasing the effectiveness and efficaciousness of conflict management techniques (i.e., the process of democratization) depends on the general adherence and compliance with the principle of diminishing the use of force and coercion in societal interactions. As the use of enforcement diminishes, the degree of self-governance must increase; as the degree of centralized authority decreases, the degree of decentralized authority must increase; or societal development will cease and, thus, presage a return to the imperatives of structural authority in social dilemmas. The proto-state, as the leading sector of the social identity group, is charged with ultimate responsibility for ensuring that sociational strategies are given clear priority and remain salient, that societal structures are truly open and accessible without discrimination, and that the incidence and escalation of instrumentality in specific conflicts is hindered and dampened as much as possible through structural incentives and sanctions. The prime directive of the political state is that it never lead the instigation, initiation, or escalation of instrumental strategies; it may only legitimately follow strict legal prescriptions for punitive measures in response to transgressions initiated by others and identified through due process of law.25 For their part, sub-groupings and individuals must accept
proper measures of responsibility for the regulation of coercion within their autonomous spheres of operation. By so doing, the use of coercion within the system is generally minimalized, as is the incidence of violence. As already noted, uses of coercion and occurrences of violence contribute to a general perception of societal crisis (lack of social order), a dissociative alienation in those directly affected by coercion and violence, and an incremental increase in the disintegrative process of societal atrophy. The initiation of coercion, and especially violence, or its escalation is always illegitimate and delegitimizing. As systemic legitimacy is the essential component of voluntary compliance and such compliance empowers legitimate authority, the state acts to negate its own resource capabilities and sources of authority if it fails to control the use of society’s instrumental potential or if it allows that potential to be used in pursuit of (non-proactive) particularist interests.

Socialization

The S in the diagram connotes the societal dynamics of the socialization process. Socialization is the process of maintaining the societal system by accumulating, through social learning processes; inculcating, through education and acculturation; and proselytizing, through social communication and promotion, the values, behaviors, and procedures that strengthen and reproduce the system’s institutional infrastructure and network of associative linkages. Individuals must choose to value the system in itself, identify with the group, accept societal responsibilities, perform obligations, and recognize that their participation in the system is crucial to its maintenance and the most effective and efficient mode for achieving personal aspirations. A social system is not a naturally occurring construct, even though humans have an innate disposition to form inter-personal ties. A system that is not valued in itself and, thereby actively maintained and reproduced, will naturally disintegrate or atrophy and thereby give way to more meaningful social formations or alternative identity groupings (or it will give way to a Hobbesian “state of nature” wherein the lack of social structures and legitimate authority results in pervasive insecurity and radical individuation justifying, or even necessitating, extreme instrumentality in social relations—Hobbes 1651/1962).

Sociopathic Activity

Also identified in Figure 3.8 are the “tails” of the social identity group model, the Active and Reactive Sociopaths. These are not functional aspects of identity formation or societal construction but are integral, and in some sense socially constructed, components of societies. The sociopaths are the deviational extremes and, as such, are important gauges of societal performance in its conflict management and development functions. The sociopaths provide measurable consequences of systemic dysfunction and failure. Deviational shifts usually occur first as attitudinal or dispositional shifts; these changes are likely to be expressed
and communicated and, so, may be monitored and measured. Under certain conditions, these highly instrumental individuals willingly instigate violence in social relations and so provide the incidence and episodic evidence of societal and systemic poor performance and failure. Their numbers, potential strength and willingness, and social justification is largely socially constructed (i.e., a function of the societal development dynamic, see above). As such, sociopathic behavior has both inherency and contingency (see Eckstein 1980b): the fact of sociopathic disposition is inherent in the social form of society; the specific expression of such disposition is a contingent function of the social system (e.g., the magnitude of instrumental behavior, the accessibility of instruments, tolerance or sympathy for deviance). The actualization of individual sociopathic activity is often the precursor to, and always a complication of, more-organized forms of political violence. In general, the greater the incidence of all types of violence committed by society members, the poorer the performance and the lesser the development of both society and system.

**Associative Linkages**

What is not shown in the main diagram (Figure 3.8) is the intricate societal network of communication and information exchanges that “connects the dots.” These are the myriad associational ties, linkages, and inter-personal networks that bond the individual members of society into a coherent, cohesive, and coordinated whole. Figure 3.9 focuses on two examples of such network connections. The majority of such ties are critically dependent on the perception of trust and amity between member dyads. Ties based in enmity are highly likely to be deformed, distorted, and action-dependent; they lack the critical element of receptivity that authenticates the exchange. Successful socialization and conflict management functions contribute to the social network; crisis produces ambivalent effects in the short-term and detrimental effects over the longer-term; violence destroys linkages by eroding trust and increasing hostility in specific cases and disables the network in general by leading individuals and groups to withdraw from extensive associations and to retract or retreat from non-essential ties (accounting for a general shift away from inclusiveness and openness toward exclusivity and closure). Substantial decreases in the number and strength of associational ties can be equated with disintegration and separation.

The two examples shown in Figure 3.9 contrast one aspect of difference in interaction densities. The group member situated at position A has a greater personal disposition to sociational strategies and, thus, must form and maintain a greater density of associative linkages as a necessary function of its societal position. The second aspect is difficult to portray; it is the strength, volume, and frequency of communication, information, and commodity exchanges that transpire across the various associational ties, or interaction density. In comparison to the member at position B, member A must supervise and sustain a much denser exchange and more diverse network of social links (both within and
across group boundaries). The transaction costs of creating associative linkages are substantial and this fact dampens the development process, especially when linkages remain a personal creation. Institutionalization formalizes established linkages and reproduces them across generational shifts so that they remain essentially intact and largely independent from the personal qualities of the individual who fills that particular social position and concomitant social role. Thus, institutionalization greatly enables the transference of societal progression and facilitates societal development. Of course, such mechanization of interactions also tends to impede innovation and, so, the value of entrepreneurialism as a natural complement to bureaucratism (i.e., the innovative creation of new societal networks or linkages that correspond to changes in societal conditions) is obviated in the progressive dynamics of societal development.

**Group Interaction and Integration**

Not only do individuals act within the social identity group, individuals also act in concert with others as agents of a social identity group in interactions with other groups. Groups distinguish themselves from other groups according to cultural
characteristics and markers that are themselves derivative of special environmental conditions and evolving modes of aesthetic, professional, or confessional expression. Thus, in understanding social group interactions it is necessary to recognize a third dimension of the human condition: termed the environmental dimension (the z-axis in Figures 3.10 and 3.11). Figure 3.10 presents a three-dimensional modeling of inter-group contention in existential space; this model depicts an instrumental contention between identity groups A and B (in the presence of a sociational alternative, supraordinate intermediary group C). Figure 3.11 presents a similar model of inter-group congruence for comparison of the peculiar interaction dynamics characteristic of instrumental, or utilitarian, relational strategies (depicted in Figure 3.10) with those specific to the use of sociational, or normative, strategies (Figure 3.11). Again, we are reminded that conflict management strategies are often viewed as “mixed” strategies wherein the “appeal” of negotiated settlements (i.e., the “carrot”) rests largely on the “power” of instrumental alternatives (the “stick”). The theory presented here rejects that intuitive connection on its face value: negotiations influenced directly by the threat of coercion are no less coercive simply because one party acts to avoid the threatened violence. Compellence is not designed to produce equitable results and claims of benevolence and legitimacy in such situations are ingenuous at best. The amorphous threat and fear of violence is ever-present in the human consciousness and does not need to be wielded directly to have persuasive force.

Figure 3.10 presents a general model of group interaction wherein group differences are accentuated, stylized, and reinforced and which then become the symbols of group conflict and the rationale for group exclusivity, a situation that can be termed the politics of difference (e.g., nationalism, ethnicism, racism). An important conflict or dispute defines the interaction between group A and group B. The issue(s) in dispute is (are) important in the definition of possible conflict solutions but the tenor of the dispute depends more on the relational dynamics of group identities and the relative capacities associated with each group’s degree of societal development (i.e., each group’s strategic disposition). There are two basic aspects to dispute issues: a material aspect, concerning the physical properties of goods and their acquisition, allocation, or distribution, and a symbolic aspect, concerning the psychic valuations of goods, identities, markers, and relations. Purely material conflict situations are technical and thus more easily solved as puzzles. When conflicts are defined in purely material terms, conflict resolution is merely a technical question and, thus, dependent on and defined by the available technologies. Purely symbolic conflict issues, on the other hand, are much more difficult to solve due to the ambiguity and subjectivity of particular meanings; they become particularly intractable when the symbols used to define the conflict involve mainly ascriptive qualities, complex and inter-linked values, and highly valued identity symbols. Identity symbols are difficult, if not impossible, to alter and are especially so under the condition of stress and duress presented by inter-group contention which naturally focuses attention on group differences and the
symbols of those differences (under such conditions, retention of symbolic differences is valued in itself, as a display of group solidarity and defiance in the face of external challenges). When symbolic issues are invoked in a dispute, the conflict then can be perceived and communicated as a vital threat to group identity or group existence even in the absence of any material threat to the group’s or group members’ physical integrity. The realization of vital threat may justify identity closure (i.e., exclusivity—signified in the diagram as a solid-line, or impermeable, identity boundary) and the resort to instrumental strategies in inter-group conflict management (signified by the separation of relational group norms—R0a and R0b—along the x-axis).

In Figure 3.10, group A has chosen to initiate an instrumental solution (actual or potential threat) in their dispute with B (i.e., A has rationalized a relational norm a or R0a and taken the Active position in the relationship); the relationship is characterized by hostility, or enmity, rather than amity. Group B is affected by A’s actions and must attempt to deter (balance) the instrumental force of A by resisting its encroachments or it may acquiesce (or capitulate) to A’s demands and accept a subordinate status in relation to A. Either way, B is relegated to a Reactive position (relational norm b or R0b) in its relationship with A, at least, until 1) B can gain an instrumental advantage over A; then, B may chose to change positions with A and become the Active position in an ongoing rivalry.
Societal Dimensions and the Dynamics of Group Conflict

(i.e., escalate or forcibly deescalate the contention); 2) both A and B decide directly to end the stalemated contention (or indirectly by growing weary of it); or 3) one party acts effectively to eliminate the identity of the other. The suprordinate alternative C is under-utilized in this case, or not pursued effectively, as each player can only use it in a way consistent with its relational norm position and chosen (or adopted) instrumental strategy, that is, to use the capabilities of C to its particular advantage (C may be either a purely symbolic or counter-factual identity alternative, and thus have psychic power in the dispute, or it may be a multilateral group identity and thus have material and psychic capabilities that exist independently of either A or B). C can not impose a solution on the contention between A and B but may 1) offer a non-instrumental alternative or 2) actively intervene to neutralize the instrumental aspect of the contention.

The rivalry between A and B, thus established, will alter political priorities and policies in both and be increasingly institutionalized and thus tend to persist or endure (i.e., structural momentum: a relational equilibrium of enmity or “enduring rivalry”). The persistence of relational enmity will tend to transform the issues of group conflict from more material to more symbolic definition and institutionalize those dynamics, thus, inter-group conflict issues will become more ideological, less tangible, and more intractable over time. If the relationship experiences actual threat (i.e., violence and coercion), that experience will tend to alter the environment and lead eventually to deterioration of the environmental condition and an increase in systemic and societal insecurity (i.e., the external “security dilemma” and internal “insecurity dilemma”). Deteriorating social conditions contribute to a general loss of sociational ability and a concomitant loss of control over the utilization of instrumental strategies in any and all environmentally-relevant social relations.

Figure 3.11, then, presents an alternative model wherein the conflicting groups acknowledge their essential identity-equality such that neither group may justify and use force to settle the dispute to its particular advantage; a common and mutually-acceptable solution must be found that transforms the conflict issue to procedural administration between the groups (i.e., interdependence) or it may be mutually agreed that no viable solution is available and the parties agree to respect their differences and withdraw from contention (i.e., autonomy). This strategic process may be termed the politics of convergence. Autonomy, representing as it does the acceptance of diversity, is an essential component in multilateral convergence and pluralist, political integration. It is especially important in situations of social conflict as it allows a third interactive option between coercion and cooperation that does not lead to identity closure in regard to future inter-group issues (as does the coercive option or the frustration of being thwarted in the pursuit of group aspirations by the “stubborn intransigence” of the “other”).

The main argument concerning inter-group conflict dynamics focuses on the conflict management technique employed, not on the outcomes. It is only the relational conflict dynamic that determines continuation or transformation of the
conflict; no conflict issue, material or symbolic, is ever \textit{finally} resolved, it may only be \textit{continually resolved} through effective conflict management and a persistent respect for and adherence to conflict settlements and management procedures. Historic conflict outcomes lend symbolic content and value to future conflicts of a similar nature. Figure 3.11, then, presents the preconditions for voluntary compliance with conflict settlement and the political integration of primordial identity groups within a supraordinate identity. Group identity \( C \) is valued by the proactive elements of both \( A \) and \( B \) for its important functional contribution to conflict management between \( A \) and \( B \). As a result, group relations are non-discriminatory, that is, the societal norms \((a, b, \text{ and } c)\) of all groups \((A, B, \text{ and } C)\) converge on the neutral instrumental position \(R_0\). The environmental differences and distinctions of the groups are not necessarily affected by such political convergence. In fact, differences are most likely to be retained, in the near-term, so as to more accurately measure the equity of inter-group relations. The assimilation of social identity is not necessary for political integration; supraordinate identity \( C \) is additive rather than superlative, it complements rather than supersedes primordial and parochial identities.

Environmental distinctions certainly distinguish groups but need not divide them. Associational linkages across group identity boundaries are common and are an essential feature in the state-building process as each successive, supraordinate
identity grouping (i.e., a qualitative expansion in the scope of group identification) must contend with, incorporate, and build upon primordial group identifications. In fact, the creation of a supraordinate identity will concomitantly create new conditions that will lead to the expression of new interest identities and the eventual mobilization of these into new identity groups. This conceptualization is in contrast to assimilation theory, which assumes that the individual will abandon all primordial identifications as a precondition for accepting and assuming full participation in the supraordinate society, and is consistent with diversity theory. It does not directly contradict assimilation theory, however. Primordial identifications are never completely abandoned, they may become progressively less salient (or even latent or dormant) as successive societal organizations are perceived to transcend more localized and ascriptive social identity functions. These primordial identities often stand in contrast to higher-order identities and as functional alternatives; the conflict of loyalties between multiple identities provides motivation for creation, efficiency, and innovation in higher-order groupings and also provides a “safety net” in case of the failure of the higher-order group structure (or the failure of individuals to operate successfully within the greater identity). The more-localized, lower-order social identity groupings that are present, compatible with, and complementary to the necessarily more abstract and recondite higher-order social identities are then symbiotic and mutually reinforcing, providing greater and more resilient structure to social identification and organization in complex societies. The genesis, evolution, and development of higher-order social identifications is the basis of the political integration process and the continuation of the societal development process at a higher level of aggregation.

Figure 3.12 displays, graphically, the conceptual distinction between the conflict management function and the political integration process. The dark arrows present the essential conflict management dynamic: minimizing the utilization of unilateral, instrumental strategies by conflicting (and potentially contending) groups. This function “forces” the groups to either 1) discover multilateral solutions to their conflicts (cooperation or coordination) or 2) accept suboptimal systemic outcomes and concentrate their group efforts on intensive societal (in-group) rather than extensive systemic (inter-group) strategies and, thereby, solve the perceived problem “within group” by altering their behavior in relation to the conflict issue (rather than, in relation to the other group). As a consequence of the successful conflict management function, technology is generally stimulated and knowledge is usually communicated and diffused. Successful practices of inter-group cooperation and coordination encourage further multilateralism; unsuccessful practices lead to the reformation of associative linkages.

Shared technologies and successful inter-group coordination experiences lead to organizational, productive, and consumer convergence in many areas. As the different social groups increasingly standardize their practices and values (i.e., as they come closer together on the environment dimension), they also gain greater trust and congruence in their shared authority patterns. That is, they shift more
functions and more identification to the increasingly integrated, supraordinate group identity. As Eckstein (1980b, 1) argues, there is a strong, positive relationship between group performance and consonance and congruence in authority patterns. The unshaded arrows in Figure 3.12 point to the area of inter-group environmental differences. These “identity gaps” will most likely be retained but strong and plentiful associational linkages will be constructed to bridge the inter-identity environmental gap; the construction of inter-group linkages will be led by the proactive elites with more self-interested linkages to follow. The lower-order identity maintains its value to many individuals, it remains a familiar identity refuge from the anonymity of “mass society” for many others, and it provides a sense of increased security to most everyone who can claim membership (i.e., a special support group).

An essential point to understanding the political integration process is that, contrary to assimilationist theory, any individual can, and most often does, maintain multiple social identity group associations and multiple group identifications. The acceptance of a higher level group identification does not eliminate the salience of maintaining lower-order or competing identifications and associational ties although these may (and probably will) be weakened as the increasing demands of “identity diversification” cause a shift in time, resource, and energy commitments. The higher-order association may take precedence if it is seen as being more
effective in providing satisfaction for the individual, in which case lower-order identities may become latent or depoliticized. The group identity for many of its members may even become completely dormant and, so, it may seem as though that particular identity has disappeared from the political arena and become extinct. However, those lower-order identifications may be re-created, re-infused, re-energized, politicized, and mobilized under the appropriate conditions (e.g., an exogenous threat to eliminate vestigial institutions or other cultural symbols) and at any time.

An individual will identify with the highest-order group which is consistent and compatible with their own political subjectivity characteristics and personal aspirations (i.e., the individual will choose to identify with the most powerful group that does not systematically deny or frustrate that individual’s access to group resources; group identity is a rational-choice in the maximization of personal power and security). Should a contention arise between group identities, the individual will tend to emphasize and maintain the group identity (or identities) within which they feel they have the greatest personal influence and the strongest personal ties. In most cases, this tendency will favor lower-order identification(s) at the expense of the higher-order identification. This does not necessarily mean that the individual will cut all associational ties with members of the larger group nor necessarily cease to identify with the larger group, but those ties and identifications will become more strained and tenuous and progressively weaker and fewer if the perceived incompatibility persists.

Again, we may witness the multi-directionality of social processes: what is socially constructed may also be deconstructed, reconstructed, or destroyed, only to be resurrected again should circumstances become conducive to their reappearance. Individuals remain very selective in the identifications, values, and behaviors that they are willing to adopt. Assimilation of environmental characteristics are not always universally appropriate and never perfect and often merely cosmetic, and so diversity must be considered the more accurate description of modern society. Modern societies are complex structures of myriad social groupings at various levels of aggregation and varying degrees of political salience. The three-actor, three-dimensional, dynamic models presented here are the most simple models of identity group interaction.

The Political Economy of Conflict

There is an essential relationship between group performance, the conflict management function, political integration, and the general process of societal development. This section will briefly examine the foundational elements of a political economy of social conflict in terms of the models presented herein. Three foundational elements will be discussed and presented conceptually: the political
Third World War

economy of societal (intra-group) contention (Figure 3.13), the political economy of systemic (inter-group) contention (Figure 3.14), and the political economy of conflict management (Figure 3.15). It is a central theoretic premise that instrumental action, viewed from a societal perspective, is intrinsically counterproductive, whereas sociational activity is inherently productive. The utility of instrumental strategies of social action, and instrumental authority in general, favors the promotion of particular interests over the interests of targeted "others" (discrimination) thus creating mutually-reinforcing dualisms and, consequently, rebellion, resistance, and insecurity. Such "aggressive political participation," to use Muller’s (1979) term, consumes productive activity and directs collective action to the goal of neutralizing the social action of others, usually without actually stopping such action so that the contention tends to be internalized, and eventually institutionalized, as an econo-cultural enterprise. Such socially discriminatory actions are contrary to those that may be described as general societal interests, those that share a fundamental interest in facilitating inclusive sociation.

In the theoretical terms described above, the basic economic tenet thus stated is simply tautological and seems, perhaps, just a bit contradictory. It has been argued that instrumental strategies are in direct opposition to sociational strategies, except when such instrumental strategies are used proactively according to strict legal prescription and in appropriate measure to quell extant uses of instrumental action (i.e., when proactive sociational strategies are employed to discipline the interaction of societal elements using instrumental strategies). The logic of this proposition seems clear: all societies will exhibit some measure of conflict neutralization activity, no society is perfectly efficient. As such, micro-economies founded on the neutralization of instrumental conflict are bound to emerge and to be formalized over time. Some individuals will benefit from the provision of this kind of “security” and groups will mobilize to promote the special interests thus construed (e.g., a military-industrial complex). Even though such instrumental action is absolutely detrimental to society in macro-terms, it can still be quite beneficial to individual members of society as it involves a great measure of (consumptive) economic activity. Then, such instrumental action is individually rational and will be likely to continue (and spread) unless the relevant societal actor (i.e., the proto-state) acts decisively to correct this “market failure” so that societal interests in sociation remain preeminent and group-detritmental action is minimized through the promotion of proactive societal mechanisms (the conflict management function). (Cf., Gurr 1988; Rosh 1988; Rapoport 1989; Regan 1994) Instrumental strategies (as rhetoric or threat) are both societal and systemic economic liabilities that are integral factors in the structure of societal relations. They pose an unnecessary economic burden that is usually under-realized until such time as the threat is transformed to violent action and then it is often “justified” as an appropriate response to an unexpected or unavoidable “crisis.” In short, when left unattended, societal and systemic instrumentality wield a powerful dynamic that severely limits societal development processes. Proactive intervention in the societal
Figure 3.13  Political Economy of Societal Contention

economy through the proper performance of the conflict management and socialization functions is crucial.

Figure 3.13 uses the existential space model of the social identity group to identify the political economy of societal (intra-group) contention. The true societal costs of instrumentality can be conceived as a measure of productive and service inefficiencies. Perfect societal efficiency may be defined as perfectly concerted action with no external coercion (i.e., perfectly voluntary compliance); harmony (as perfect assimilation or the absence of conflict) is not necessary as conflict is perfectly managed through self-regulation. The point of "perfect societal efficiency" is designated by the societal norm on the x-axis (R0), such perfect regimentation has long been the dream of the imperial and fascist states. Of course, perfect societal efficiency, while approachable over the short-term (e.g., Nazi Germany), is not humanly possible over any longer term due to the inherent societal dynamic to construct deviation and diversity (i.e., deviation is socially constructed). Some deviation from the societal norm is a natural and necessary response to inherent, chaotic conflict and such conflict is crucial to the maintenance of group identity and sociation. Societal efficiency diminishes quite rapidly as a function of instrumental deviation from the central norm, however. Each unit increase in instrumentality signifies an exponential increase in societal costs and so also in societal inefficiency (this point will be expanded in the discussion of Figure 3.15 below). The prime
Third World War

directive of conflict management, then, is to channel the societal “will to diversify” away from instrumental expression toward greater environmental expression, away from fueling opposition and contention to stimulating creativity, competitiveness, and plurality. The prime function of the societal system is to minimize instrumentality and, by so doing, maximize societal performance (within the limitations posed by technological and environmental factors). In macro-theoretical terms, the measure of societal inefficiency of a social identity group is the total deviation along the instrumental axis.

The political economy of systemic contention is modeled in Figure 3.14. The system model focuses on the interaction of a social identity group dyad (a supraordinate, intermediary “proactive” group is again included as a referent). The measure of systemic inefficiency corresponds to the measure of relational difference between the societal norms of the contending groups along the instrumental axis. Most important is the assertion that, while conflict is inherent in social systems, the degree and extent of conflict and the modes of conflict interaction (i.e., how much and what kinds of coercion are used in situations of contention) are contingent characteristics. The dynamics of inter-group economy are similar in all respects to those detailed above for intra-group economy. The political economy of political contention derives from two principles: an Active behavior and its Reactive response (or opposition) taken together negate each other and thereby produce no net positive systemic effect; any actual use of instrumental force will produce a net negative effect as lives, resources, and infra-structure are invariably lost in the instrumental exchange termed warfare. Again, coercive conflict can stimulate a positive effect, such as pointing out a need for more effective institutions of conflict management or motivating the search for new technologies, but it can not produce a net positive effect; the stimulant effect that such contention produces within the opposing societies is totally consumed in the augmentation of instrumental capabilities. Again, instrumental economies can be seen, myopically, as having a positive utility for individual actors as they can be used to create unequal exchanges between groups and result in relative gains in the short-term; in the long-term, even those relative gains are negated by the need to maintain structural authority over the terms of the unequal relationship (these costs increase over time as the reactive group increasingly mobilizes its resistance to the source of the inequity). In short, contention (i.e., instrumental confrontation beyond the point of non-violent competition) decreases net societal production despite a net increase in societal activity and, thus, hinders societal development by limiting the resources available for socialization and other physical system maintenance (basic needs and quality of life) functions. Contention over the longer term will increase system atrophy and tendencies toward retrogression, dissociation, and disintegration (cf., the concept of “imperial overstretch” forwarded by Paul Kennedy 1987).

Of course, any social system can and must expect to absorb some loss of potential capability due to conflicting behaviors; perfectly equitable systems are
utopian dreams just as perfectly regimented societies are horrendous nightmares. Coser (1973) has asserted that some degree of conflict and potential contention is absolutely necessary for stimulation of systemic activity and as a raison d'être to rally systemic cohesion. In this sense, a minimal degree of instrumental behavior is socially constructed by the system and this provides the tension necessary to maintain the social structure itself. The actual amount of instrumental behaviors will fluctuate within a normatively prescribed range, that is, between order and disorder. A societal system will tend to neglect its conflict management function once an acceptable degree of societal order has been established (i.e., it will liberalize or become overly tolerant to incremental deviations) until a culturally-defined threshold of societal disorder is reached; at that point the society will begin to shift its attention more to the conflict management function amidst general public calls for greater social order. Once the threshold of order is regained, the society will tend to relax once again. The instrumental distance between these perceptual thresholds narrows as a function of societal and systemic development.

Still, each system seems to have a carrying capacity wherein a certain magnitude of endogenous (societal) or exogenous (systemic) contention turns a net productive society into net consuming society. The point of transformation to collective violence is the best general indicator of this concept of systemic carrying capacity. Two little conflict makes a social system appear flaccid and superfluous
and too much contention leads to systemic deterioration and disintegration. Dissociation is accelerated by the incidence of violence; general sociotaxial malaise is prompted by a pervasive perception of coercive threat (insecurity).

One possible theoretic explanation of the relationship between conflict and development is the claim that there is a “U” curve relationship between these processes such that an optimal amount of conflict is attained where the marginal gains of an additional unit of conflict produces no net benefit (and incrementally increasing loss) for the society; Brunk et al. (1987) make such an argument. The theoretic explanation offered here is that conflict per se is not necessarily societally inefficient; it is the methods (i.e., the degree of coercion, magnitude of force, intensity of violence) that define the abreaction to the conflict that determines the net cost to society for the conflict management function. That is to say, it is the special transformation of the conflict stimulus to a political behavior that is crucial in political economy; conflict stimuli may be transformed to sociotaxial power or instrumental force and this transformation is structurally determined. It is the primary function and responsibility of the state (or the group’s proto-state) to manage social conflict effectively and efficiently and thereby channel and direct the potential energy of the conflict stimulus into sociotaxial productive and reproductive activities and to minimize issues of contention (and resulting grievance and production losses).²⁹

Figure 3.15 returns to the “Transformational Aspects of Conflict Management” model of the general social conflict process (see Figure 2.1 above) in order to summarize the arguments and propositions that define the political economy of conflict management. To recap the social conflict process, it was proposed that there are three fundamental transformations in the social conflict process: 1) the politicization of a conflict situation (“conflict”—a subset of those affected and cognizant); 2) the mobilization of resources to solve the conflict (“mobilization”—a subset of those politicized); and 3) the utilization of violence to force a conflict settlement (“violence”—a subset of those mobilized).

Each social transformation requires a qualitative and quantitative increase in resources expended and consumed. The main components of the theoretic political economy are overlaid on the social process model in Figure 3.15: 1) the $y$-axis on the left is a measure of the “probability of successful conflict resolution” (SCR) ranging from 0 (low) to 1 (high) and 2) the $y$-axis on the right is a measure of the “social costs of conflict management” (CM) ranging from relatively low costs (low) to relatively high costs (high).

Over the course of the social conflict process from “cognition” to “abreaction” an unsuccessfully managed conflict process will tend to persist, escalate, and eventually transform to include the more-consumptive social activities within its interactive dynamics: politicization, mobilization, and violence. The probability of successful resolution (SCR) of the conflict situation will begin very high and diminish exponentially over the course of the conflict interaction and through its attendant transformations (represented as the curve sloping downward from left to
right in the diagram—an unresolved conflict process will eventually terminate by attrition in the exhaustion, or “war weariness,” of one or both of the conflict parties. The social costs of conflict management (CM; i.e., the total costs to society and system of the resources expended, consumed, diverted, destroyed, deformed, lost, dispersed, etc. and specific to the conflict process activities and externalities) will begin very low and increase exponentially over the course of the conflict process.

Societal economic rationality (defined as successful conflict resolution or maximum security at minimal social cost) dictates that conflict processes should be successfully resolved as early in the process as is possible and feasible. The societal dynamic of diversity allows that all conflict be resolved prior to the generation of political violence. The viable social identity group will institutionalize successful conflict management procedures to include the vast majority of potential conflict situations and thus accomplish such economic rationality to a large extent structurally. This is the economic contribution of the societal proto-state to society and it is the direct result of successful conflict management experience. Successful conflict management emphasizes sociational strategies and actively pursues normative strategies of conflict management. Normative strategies concentrate on the socialization of members, the regulation of provocative activities, and the institutionalization of conflict management procedures so as to gain a high probability of success in anticipation of politicization and in the accessibility of the
system to accommodate aggrieved individuals. *Organizational strategies* focus on the capacity of the system to incorporate the participation of mobilized interest groups and to facilitate appropriate procedural innovations.

Failures of a society’s normative and organizational strategies will often result in very high profile, extremely risky, and enormously costly conflict confrontations that include substantial political violence. These situations involve reciprocal applications of instrumental force and necessitate *utilitarian strategies* of conflict management. Utilitarian strategies are relatively simple to comprehend and therein lies their “fatal attraction.” Utilitarian strategies concentrate on the actual or threatened unilateral application of superior physical force to alter the conflict behavior of the opposing party in an obvious, hostile encounter (i.e., the enemy other). As such, utilitarian strategies focus on the relative capabilities and capacitance of the opposing social groups. (*Cf.*, Bueno de Mesquita 1981) Over-reliance on utilitarian strategies diminishes the productive capacity of the society and so decreases the material capabilities of the actor while increasing the number of its potential opponents (i.e., the “threatened others”).

Thus, the superior performance of the liberal democracies is attributable primarily to their primary reliance on and successful use of normative and organizational strategies in societal relations (i.e., maximal societal efficiency). Unfortunately, these highly successful societies have not been similarly successful in their conflict management approach to systemic interactions (i.e., they enjoy partial success: they are primarily normative and thus benefit from high systemic efficiency when interacting with other liberal democracies—the democratic peace proposition—but are extremely utilitarian and thus highly inefficient when dealing with the rest of the world, see chapter 5). Chapter 4 will examine the conflict dynamics of the “global insecurity system” as a way to explain the resulting societal and systemic inefficiencies and the general condition of “arrested development” in the Third World, especially, and the entire world system, in general.

**The Conflict-Development Nexus**

Before moving on to an application of the theoretical construct and the derivation of testable hypotheses, it will be helpful to examine the proposed social relationships between conflict, violence, and development from another perspective. The argument posed to this point has asserted that systemic development is neither an incontroversible, immutable, nor irreversible function of a social system, although there is a developmental dynamic inherent in human sociation. Sociation is a fundamental, rational choice aspect of the human social condition; sociation strategies are economically efficient and so are the preferred strategic option. Sociation leads to the association and identification of individuals in social identity groups. Development is driven by the human will for existential progress in goal
satisfaction and progresses as a function of successful conflict management by the political state and successful socialization by the societal proto-state. Societal and systemic development are inhibited and hindered by the utilization of instrumental strategies of coercive threat and political violence. The presentation of this theoretic argument in an “opportunity and willingness framework” will further aid comprehension by focusing on the practical aspects of the social conflict process. (Most and Starr 1989) The conceptual visualization schemes presented in this section are constructed using an “opportunity-willingness” (O-W) schematic to illustrate the theorized processual relationship, or nexus, between conflict and development and the special effects that violence imposes at that nexus.

Figure 3.16 presents the basic model for this perspective. “Opportunity” is simply defined as “a shorthand term for the possibilities that are available within any environment.” (Most and Starr 1989, 23) In the present application, the term refers to the possibility of contentious interaction. The possibility of contentious interaction is a contingent function of the potential for conflict. Implicit in that conceptualization is the proposition that the greater the aggregation of society the larger the actual number of social interactions and, therefore, the larger the number of potentially conflictual situations and conflict processes (i.e., intrinsic to each social interaction is both a conflict potential and a contention possibility). The “opportunity curve” (O,O') in Figure 3.16 simply connotes the proposal that, as a function of the societal development process (i.e., “developmental time”), the number of group interactions and conflict situations increases.

“Willingness” is defined as “a shorthand term for the choice (and process of choice) that is related to the selection of some behavioral option from a range of alternatives.” (Most and Starr 1989, 23) As regards potentially contentious interactions, it refers to the societal capacitance (or political disposition) of the political actor to use instrumental strategies in the solution of contentions. The “Willingness Curve” (W,W') reflects the proposition that, as a function of the societal development process, the willingness to utilize instrumental force in the solution of contentions diminishes (implicit in this assumption is the proposition that, as a function of societal development, other non-coercive resolution options are increasing available and are understood to be more efficacious than the coercive options in certain situations). To relate these terms to the terminology deployed above, “opportunity” results from and, so, corresponds with the preferential use of sociational strategies and “willingness” corresponds to the capacity of the social identity group to use instrumental strategies. Thus, the opportunity and willingness curves are posited to be negatively correlated, as are the utilizations of sociational and instrumental strategies.

The particular shapes of the Opportunity and Willingness curves are a function of the environmental context of societal development, that is, in both its endogenous and exogenous aspects. A social identity group does not develop in a vacuum; it evolves and develops within a generally chaotic context involving numerous social identity groupings and infinite possibilities, each identity group going through
similar development processes. The group development process may be divided into three qualitative phases: intensive, transitional, and extensive. In the intensive phase, the group members and leadership are preoccupied with the fact of increasing endogenous opportunities and, so, in developing organizational mechanisms and techniques of internal conflict management. The degree and character of exogenous interference or influence is a crucial variable during this phase, especially as the world has become increasingly, complexly interdependent. Exogenous interference during the intensive phase of group development complicates endogenous conflict dynamics and diverts the attention and resources of societal members and, especially, the political state and societal elites away from internal conflict management toward external conflict management. At best, this may facilitate and, thus, shorten the time frame of development as the external sources provide sociational technologies in a non-threatening manner. In the more likely scenario, such interference will prolong the course of the intensive development phase and truncate the course of subsequent extensive development (as intensive and extensive development are largely concomitant in the initial development phase). At worst, that is, when external interference is improperly applied to take advantage of an exploitable situation, this will prevent the consolidation of state authority and capacity to manage conflict by inducing it to a greater emphasis on instrumental strategies, increased economic inefficiencies, and
a greater incidence of conflict management failures (i.e., state failure). Overemphasis on instrumental strategies institutionalizes the “coercive state” thus inhibiting associations with external actors and suppressing higher-order social identifications (i.e., the “prisoners’ dilemma”).

In the Transitional phase, the group has consolidated its societal capabilities and turns more of its aggregate attention to interactions with its systemic environment, that is, interactions with other societal groups. Endogenous conflict management techniques and institutions are insufficient and often inappropriate for dealing with exogenous conflict interactions (unilateral methods are relatively over-developed and multilateral methods under-developed due to the relative lack of technology in the early development process). Ignorance of the ways of the external environment and uncertainty of interaction outcomes often makes the emerging actor hesitant in their pursuit of increased interaction opportunities and unwilling to forego the perceived utility of the overt force (i.e., unilateral methods or “rational self-help”) as a conflict management option. The group often attempts to compensate for its (perceived) increased vulnerability in the external environment by overemphasizing the values and merits of isolation and group exclusivity (i.e., “nationalism”). Thus, there will be noted a dampening of developmental progress as the group adjusts to the external environment and the slope of the opportunity and willingness curves will tend to level out. Should the group develop the capability and capacitance to sufficiently and unilaterally guarantee its own security in the external environment, it enters the third developmental phase. Of course, the capabilities and capacitance necessary for such societal security within the larger system are largely determined by systemic conditions.

During the Extensive phase, the group again experiences increasing opportunities and a diminishing willingness to use force in its interaction opportunities. The confluence of increasing external opportunities and diminishing willingness to use force are the necessary preconditions for the political integration process and the formation of higher-order social identity groupings (i.e., the establishment of a proactive consensus). Thus, the development process has no end point; once conditions have progressed to the extensive phase the group’s development process corresponds with the intensive phase of a higher-order social identity group development process at a greater level of social systemic aggregation.

The factor that most strongly influences the relative length of developmental time specific to any social identity grouping is the amount of instrumental force and violence experienced by the group and its individual members. Basically, the more violence experienced, the longer the development process takes. Technology, on the other hand, provides the strongest influence on the absolute temporal span of the development process; the greater the available level of technology, the faster the (potential) pace of development. Referring back to the social identity group model and the problems of societal development (Figure 3.8), the experience of violence contributes to societal disintegration processes (i.e., crisis and atrophy) and hinders societal integration processes (i.e., socialization and conflict management).
Figure 3.17, “Violence and Sociational Underdevelopment,” illustrates how the development process, conceptualized in the O-W framework, is affected by the occurrence of political violence. During the Intensive phase, violence affects the length of time a society requires to transgress this development phase; it also determines the viability of the group (i.e., unsuccessful conflict management may lead to identity dissolution). Protracted social conflict is a conceptualization of the problem of recurrent collective violence in the Intensive phase of societal development and the “arresting” affect this violence has on the development process. The character of warfare during this phase is largely civil, or intra-state, warfare between identity groups vying for control of the institutional state of the larger society or contending directly with those institutions. The result can be developmental arrest, disintegration, or even radical implosion (in which a “culture of violence” characterizes the societal system due to the failure of the state to properly manage conflict).

The problem of recurrent collective violence in the Transitional phase of societal development is a categorical phenomenon much more familiar to Western political science. This problem is signified by the occurrence of “nationalism,” “enduring rivalries” (see Gochman and Maoz 1984), an “anarchic” political environment or system, and a “prisoners’ dilemma” of interaction. Once the societal structure of individual social identity groups has been institutionalized to a sufficient degree, the social group and its political state will increase interactions with external “others” within its geopolitical, or systemic, context. Issues of state autonomy and security become predominant within a context of ambiguity, uncertainty, and lack of sociational management options. The proposed effect of substantial political violence on the general development process during the Transitional phase is illustrated in Figure 3.17. Curves (W,W1) and (O,O1) present a situation of significant violence: the development process is hampered but not thwarted. Curves (W,W2) and (O,O2) represent a situation of serious violence: the development process is arrested and the phase of Extensive development, characterized by the increasing political integration of societies, is not reached (intensive development may continue due to technology advances but systemic efficiencies are lost).

Curves (W,W3) and (O,O3) portray a condition of severe and pervasive political violence: the high incidence, intensity, and long temporal span of protracted violence results in a net consumption of societal and systemic capabilities (and potential) and an actual reversal of the development process, such that societies interact less (decreasing opportunity) and are increasingly prone to seek instrumental (militant) solutions in their increasingly contentious interactions (increasing willingness). Frequent and recurring political violence in the Extensive phase may best be conceived as “backsliding” or contextual deterioration. The process of integration is reversed such that lower-order identities attain greater salience for larger numbers of individuals and the higher-order identities lose credibility, meaning, and appeal: national identities hold precedence over supra-
national identities while ethnic identities command increasing precedence over national identities and so on. In effect, the Extensive phase of development is precluded and political integration is rejected in favor of a return to the conditions of the Transitional phase and the preeminence of parochial autonomy and local security issues.

In order for contention to occur there must be both opportunity and willingness: “opportunity and willingness should be viewed as jointly necessary conditions; neither alone is sufficient.” (Most and Starr 1989, 40) The possibility of contention in the development process is defined by the area of the model where both opportunity and willingness are present; this possibility area is delineated in the O-W models (Figures 3.16 and 3.17) by the possibilities curve (O,W’). In the normal development process model (Figure 3.16) the possibility of contention takes the form of a semi-circle. This form then defines the realm of possibility and this forms the basis of the “possibilities area” presented in Figure 3.18. Within this universe of possibilities, the actual occurrence of political contention is episodic and each episode is determined by a particular set of circumstances within a special set of contextual conditions. Each episode is a separate event with unique circumstances and special determination of outcome. Yet, each episode also takes place within a general social process and is conditioned by the general environmental context. Each social event is at once independent and a dependent variable; it is both an
effect of precedent possibilities, a condition of subsequent possibilities, and a cause of consequent possibilities. Like the “nature” of the individual, the “nature” of an individual situation in a complex system of myriad social interactions is largely chaotic: the possibility and the determination of the event are a momentous result of the interplay of a complex set of unique factors. The aggregation of related interactive events is best conceived as a chaotic system.

The processual transformation of any given social contention to politicization, mobilization, or violence is proposed to be a function of the conflict management capabilities of the interactive system and, so, in large part determined according to a socially constructed probability factor: the probability that the management system can successfully manage the abreaction of the conflict contention and avoid the costly transformation to violence.

Figure 3.18 presents four probability hypotheses. The A probability curve represents a null hypothesis: the probability of violence is a constant function of the possibility of violence and the development process; this hypothesis claims that violence is inherent in the social conflict process and not contingent on socially constructed conditions. The B curve presents a probability relationship based on the theory that violence is caused by ignorance of, or the non-availability of, non-coercive substitutable options for conflict management; the probability of violence is high early in the development process but once non-coercive alternatives are
Societal Dimensions and the Dynamics of Group Conflict

1. As a reminder, individual acts of violence are not considered part of the universe of inquiry because they are not considered to be inherently political; they are, rather, inherently self-interested as they require no political communication to effect the decision to act (and probably the opposite: political communication would most likely work against such a purely self-interested decision). As such, establishing a theoretical connection between individual and group acts of violence is especially problematic and, clearly, beyond the scope of the present work. My intuition favors the feminist argument that collective and individual decisions to use violence are, also, environmentally or culturally linked.

2. A major exception is found in the extensive debates over the “national question” among the socialist intelligentsia prior to the outbreak of World War I and directly surrounding the formation of the Soviet state. (Marshall 1990)

3. Such is not the case in sociological studies, however, where attempts to theorize social typologies of human behavior are the rule rather than the exception. The prevalence of discovery, learned, and institutionalized (itself a function of the development process), the probability of violence diminishes. Curve C presents a probability factor based on a theory that both ignorance of the alternatives and uncertainty over the outcomes of conflict interactions influence the perceived utility of the violence option; thus, the probability factor diminishes as alternative options are instituted and then rises again as the group increases its interactions with other, largely unknown, groups in the less familiar external environment. D details a probability factor based on a proposition that, whatever the determinants of the endogenous probability factor (in this representation, both ignorance and uncertainty are accepted as influencing the probability factor), a pervasive perception of insecurity significantly increases the probability of violence (given its possibility).

From a chaotic, social systems perspective, then, the potential for controlling the incidence of violence is mainly contained within the development process. In this broad view, the “invisible hand” of social structure and system constructed according to the dynamics of human rational choice, sociation, and technical evolution guides humanity away from the utilitarian preeminence of instrumental strategies in social relations to an ever more-efficient organization of society and the elevation and predominance of sociational strategies and normative structures. Recognition, comprehension, and institutionalization of the technical elements of conflict management will enable continual progress in societal and systemic development and the progressive improvement of the human condition for all and without the exclusion of any social groups. The problem of political violence interrupts, hinders, and distorts this natural progression by altering the environment and conditioning the perceptions of utility in social instruments and the viability of sociation in relationships. It is to an examination of the social condition of insecurity that we turn next.

Notes

1. As a reminder, individual acts of violence are not considered part of the universe of inquiry because they are not considered to be inherently political; they are, rather, inherently self-interested as they require no political communication to effect the decision to act (and probably the opposite: political communication would most likely work against such a purely self-interested decision). As such, establishing a theoretical connection between individual and group acts of violence is especially problematic and, clearly, beyond the scope of the present work. My intuition favors the feminist argument that collective and individual decisions to use violence are, also, environmentally or culturally linked.

2. A major exception is found in the extensive debates over the “national question” among the socialist intelligentsia prior to the outbreak of World War I and directly surrounding the formation of the Soviet state. (Marshall 1990)

3. Such is not the case in sociological studies, however, where attempts to theorize social typologies of human behavior are the rule rather than the exception. The prevalence
of unitary nature assumptions in political science are most likely a function of
the underlying desire to promote a particular political agenda. That is the supreme irony
of behavioralism in political science: the professed desire to discover a “value-free” science
while, at the same time, biasing the inquiry through fundamental assumptions of human
nature that favor a particular outcome. (Joseph 1988; Nelson 1993) The model of human
nature proposed here was originally based on the social conflict work of Simmel (1956
1971) and his concepts of *sociation, individuation, and social forms.* (Spykman 1925;
Wolf 1950; Coser 1965) It is also informed by similar work of Pareto and his work on
*residues.* (Pareto 1966; Tarascio 1991). Also, influential in the genesis of the model is the
work of Parsons (1951) on social systems. It is important to distinguish the dynamics of
dispositional differentiation, proposed here, from similar societal dynamics of labor
differentiation proposed by Durkheim (1933): the former focuses on how the individual
identifies with the social identity group and how that identification informs its
sociability, the latter focuses on how the individual distinguishes itself with the societal context so as
to gain a measure of control over its interactions and thereby retain its individuality.

4. There is no intent in this statement to step either into the highly emotive issue
centered on defining the moment of human life and human rights or the “nature-nurture”
debate. It is stated in the belief that all humans, as beings, enjoy equal potential at the
beginning and that this equal potential is differentially affected throughout the life cycle
of the individual. The intent is to assume that no human being is genetically or naturally
superior or inferior as a human being.

5. The idea of “existential reality” may be contrasted to that of “physical reality.” The
main difference is, as noted, the exercise of free will in existential reality which manifests
as variability in individual behavior. The concomitant lack of free will in physical reality
leads to deterministic interactions between agents and reagents; variation in outcomes is
dependent on qualities imposed by the interaction and inherent in the different properties
that agents and reagents bring to the interaction. It can therefore be argued that physical
reality is pre-determined and comprehensible, both predictably and postdictably, through
the discovery of the immutable laws of interaction which may be understood as causal
relationships. Such pre-determination is not applicable to existential reality and fatalism
is disavowed, primarily because it serves to absolve the individual from personal
responsibility (and liability) for its actions. Existential reality is based on reason, adaption,
dialectic interaction, and probabilistic outcomes. Predictability results from common
physical properties and by the essential relationship between existential and physical
realities; existential reality operates within the parameters and constraints of the physical
world. I would suggest the reader consult the several works of Dostoevskii, Sartre, and
Camus for more extensive treatments. The present work is informed by *theistic
existentialism.*

6. Morgenthau (1948) makes a similar distinction between “political power” and
“military power,” however, he presents the distinction in von Clausewitzian terms as a
variation in kind rather than an opposition.

7. Actually, the threat of the use of violence, or of additional violence, is much more
efficacious in guiding or controlling behavior than the act of violence itself. Unfortunately,
the *credibility* of the threat of violence must be periodically authenticated and validated
through the actual use of violence. Arendt goes on to argue that the use of violence is itself
uncontrollable and so the illusion of “coercive control” is really a contradiction in terms.

8. The idea of a variable disposition toward instrumental or coercive strategies in
Societal Dimensions and the Dynamics of Group Conflict

Social relations is not new to the social sciences. Many attempts have been made to identify and measure such psychological traits. Prominent among these is the Adorno et al. (1950) study of The Authoritarian Personality. While explanations of the observed variation along such psychological dimensions has been a topic of controversy (e.g., Christie and Johoda 1954), the fact of measurable variation in personality traits or attitudes toward the use of violence along authoritarian dimensions is supportive of the notion that human nature is both variable and malleable and thereby better represented as a dimensional continuum than as either a unitary or dichotomous quality. Rapoport (1989, 84) notes that persons perceived to be either to the far Right or the far Left of the political spectrum “frequently scored high on the F-scale [the so-called fascist scale]; so that a monotone relationship between this scale and the position on the political spectrum could not be supported by evidence.” This does, however, appear to support the notion of an instrumental dualism. Christie (1954) gives evidence that authoritarian attitudes are more pronounced among persons of lower status, lesser education, and limited intelligence, all of which point to a stronger identification with the immediate self as opposed to identification with the extended social group. This observation is also consistent with the model of human nature to be presented here.

9. The implied interaction dynamics between active and reactive is the basis of many contemporary theories of political conflict within society. The argument is consistent with the concept and impetus of relative deprivation. (Gurr 1971) Similar interaction dynamics are implied in Tilly (1978) when he differentiates between members and challengers of the established polity, a dialectic relationship that is especially apparent in what he terms “revolutionary situations.”

10. According to Simmel, “Sociation is the form (realized in innumerable different ways) in which individuals grow together into a unity and within which their interests are realized. And it is on the basis of their interests—sensuous or ideal, momentary or lasting, conscious or unconscious, causal or teleological—that individuals form such unities.” (1908/1971a, 24)

11. Actually, the simple two-dimensional identity model assumes perfect cultural (or environmental) assimilation, that is, no variation in the third-dimension societal attribute. Such perfection is not practical and, so, the social forms model should be thought to possess full geometric form on three dimensions. Variation on the third-dimension imparts a societal impetus to plurality as additional identities form in accordance with variations in environmental prerogatives and imperatives. Thus, individuality can remain diverse in the face of the social imperative to assimilation as individuals diversify their interests across groups through multiple group memberships and the formation of associational ties with members of other groups.

12. Such an assumption is similar in many respects to the standard statistical (or normal) distribution curve, especially its usefulness in mathematical analogies as they may be applied to political analysis. It is, however, fundamentally different in many important respects which differentiate this conceptualization of the special characteristics of social sciences from those of the (hard) physical sciences. First, the recognition of the subjective nature of human experience and the inherent dualism of human instrumental behavior in the social context transforms the x-axis from an absolute, ratio scale with a fixed “zero” point to a relative, interval scale with a floating “zero” point (denoted as “R0” in Figure 3.4). This is due to the qualitative difference between how an individual perceives its relationship to its own social identity group (the psychological “us”) and how it perceives
its own group’s relationship to all other groups (“them”). The relative zero point of any particular group is scaled along an absolute exogenous scale which is rendered absolute endogenously by its subjective position of neutrality within the relevant universe of human social behavior. Reference to Wallerstein’s (1974) conception of a “world” might be helpful in comprehension of this abstraction. To Wallerstein, a “world” is the furthest extent of relevance in a real, social sense; only the “world” which coincides with the whole earth can be thought of as an absolute, i.e., the absolute furthest extent of human social relevance. The measurement intervals are measured as distance from the relative zero point (expected value; designated as the “social norm”). There is no inference of positive and negative direction from zero, thus active behavior is presented to the left of zero as it (action) precedes reactive behavior (reaction) in sequential ordering. Second, the y-axis is an interval measure of an opposite quality of the x-axis; it is not a measure of the frequency of occurrences of the x property. Because of the intimate relationship between the x and y properties (i.e., individual dispositions are, to a significant extent, formed by the exigencies and relational dynamics of the social organism itself), however, an inference can be made that in any social identity group of sufficient statistic size (n) there is a high probability that the statistical distribution and the subjectivity distribution will coincide (i.e., they will be highly correlated). The difference is rather qualitative such that each occurrence of property x will have a different value of y. The shape of the human possibilities curve appears to favor values of y over values of x because property x is a dualism whereas y is a unity (i.e., each occurrence of x creates an opposing value of x whereas each occurrence of y creates an equal value of y).

13. A “contention” is a conflict situation wherein a vital threat is perceived in the context of incompatible and incontrovertible demands, i.e., a threat or crisis situation.

14. This trifurcation of societal process may be related, in its psychological manifestation, to Hegelian dialectics and, in its behavioral manifestation, to Marxian dialectical materialism. That is, the Active (thesis) creates its negation as the Reactive (antithesis) and the negation of that negation results in the Proactive (synthesis). This is, of course, dialectics in its simplest form.

15. It is when the proto-state of the social identity group coincides exactly with the political state that a condition of liberal democracy exists. Liberal democracy, I argue, is the form of “aristocratic republicanism” envisioned by Kant as giving “a favorable prospect for the desired consequence, i.e., perpetual peace.” (1795/1957, 14) Radical democracy is “necessarily a despotism” because it favors individual self-interest over individualized societal-interest. Procedural (or electoral) democracy may be thought of as reference to the mechanisms by which the representatives of the proto-state are more or less successfully identified and through which the proto-state becomes politically empowered.

16. The concept “natural elite,” as already described, refers to individuals who have an optimal combination of social capabilities. A person in one of the statistical tails of the distribution may be thought of as a member of a “sociopathic elite,” that is, someone who is both asocial and antisocial and who is, therefore, (potentially) extremely accomplished at disrupting normal society. Those individuals would be willing to go to extreme lengths (maxima x) to promote (or protect) their personal interests *vis-à-vis* society (minimum y). “Societal elites” form the core of the legitimate proto-state; should some other elite grouping gain control of the institutional-state apparatus (or should the state’s practices deviate substantially from the expectations derived from the societal norm), the state will be viewed as illegitimate by a significant section of the group constituency and the society
Societal Dimensions and the Dynamics of Group Conflict

will tend to disintegrate into distinct and opposing groups. This situation of an illegitimate-instrumental group capturing the institutional apparatus of the state, I would argue, is best illustrated by the Stalinist coup in the Soviet Union in about 1928, a situation that shifted the Soviet state from a basically legitimate authority to a highly instrumental authority (i.e., totalitarian) system.

17. Friedrich and Brzezinski (1965) make a rational-choice argument concerning the degree to which (competing) elites exert control over the group’s perception of crisis through the manipulation of information and evocative symbols thereby augmenting the power of those particular elites and their particularist conception of the state (i.e., attempts by elites to redefine, and thereby shift, the societal norm from reactive or normal mode to active mode). Arendt (1973) emphasizes contextual considerations when she argues that societal conditions shift the societal norm to a crisis norm and thereby empower certain (alternative) elites. Arendt argues that, while these context-conditional crisis elites may manipulate evocative symbols in order to augment their power, they have little control over the definition of societal norms and are held captive by the anomalous social psychology (or political mood) of the masses. It is only after environmental conditions change that an effective change in leadership is possible. Consistent with the general theme of this study, it would appear that both basic arguments have merit and should be considered as contributing and reinforcing aspects of a single, complex explanation.

18. For purposes of this illustration, group relative zero (R0) is assumed to coincide with absolute zero. Of course, its relative nature means it has two aspects: one, it has no value in the relative (societal) context and, two, it has some value (R0x) in the absolute context. In group-relational terms, the amount of coercion “a” is willing to bring to bear in the exogenous environment is “a+R0x” and the value for “r” is “R0x-rx.” This distinction in instrumental dispositions will be clarified with the introduction of the full three-dimensional conceptual space model (Figure 3.10) below.

19. P’s willingness to associate with other groups in a conflict situation is conditioned by the societal norm and its relational status to the external context; in other words, p will always be willing to associate with socially-relevant others but only provisionally willing to associate with socially-irrelevant others (p is bound by the group’s relational norm, R0x). This distinction is dependent upon an explanation of the group-relational aspects of the external environment (i.e., the third-dimension presented in the following section). The political perspectives associated with the three “competing elites” are according to the designations pertinent in the United States. The political designations pertinent to European political terminology are more apt to be Conservatism (a), Socialism (p), and Labour or Communism (r).

20. The proactive is considered a latent class subgroup because their basically non-coercive identity made their politicization irrelevant as long as the aristocratic social order and rationale was generally accepted throughout society. The middle-class was stimulated to political (pro)action as a result of rising tensions between the privileged and exploited classes. The outcome of the European class warfare was determined when the bulk of the proactive middle class sided with either the active or reactive class factions; capitalism saw the middle class side with the privileged classes and communism resulted from a proactive alliance with the reactive class, the laboring masses.

21. The term “distributive justice” is from Walzer (1983); it is very closely related to Gurr’s (1970) concept of “relative deprivation.” Both terms are similar to the more generally used term “discrimination.” The Minorities at Risk project has detailed the
contemporary relationship between discriminatory practices, group identity, and political contention in its global survey of 233 such situations (Gurr 1993). Discrimination need not be confined to particular forms of deprivation (economic, social, or political deprivations may contribute to group fragmentation) and such practices need not target only the reactive groups. In situations where the reactive group has been preeminent (e.g., in communist countries), it is often the active groups (i.e., the more affluent groups) who feel they are being deprived or held back in their self-promotion and who have most strenuously pursued separation. (Horowitz 1985; Emizet and Templin 1991)

22. This argument departs from Dahl (1989, 252) who argues that such instrumental power should be decentralized and dispersed “among a number of relatively independent actors” so that no one actor can gain “unilateral domination.” This prescription stands in contrast to Max Weber’s ideal state and its monopoly (i.e., concentration) of instrumental capabilities. Here we can see the basic elements of the fundamental security debate between balance-of-power and hegemonic-stability advocates. Both these security prescriptions are conceived with the intent to maintain high levels of instrumental capability. It is argued here that it is this disposition that is the problem (i.e., the disposition to maintain high levels of instrumental capability) and that no mechanisms can reliably control the end-uses when the dispositions remain strong.

23. Of course, in a basically chaotic societal system, associational ties are continually breaking down, discarded, reformulated, and replaced. It is the gross creation, maintenance, and reproduction of such linkages that define and determine societal efficacy and performance and the net additional creation that equates with societal and systemic development.

24. Societal over-consumption has two aspects: “positive” over-consumption is the diversion of societal production from capital accumulation or societal reproduction to unnecessary or sub-optimally beneficial consumption (e.g., the production of security rather than welfare); “negative” over-consumption refers to foregone production (opportunity costs) resulting from the diversion of resources.

25. This is a necessarily too brief description of the “rule-of-law” regime that characterizes procedural democracy. Liberal democracy is distinguished by 1) republicanism (separation of executive, judicial, and legislative power); 2) liberal economics (separation of the political state and civil society, that is, minimization of governmental interference in economic activity—Brunk et al. 1987 argue moderation rather than minimization); and 3) secularization (separation of church, or societal morality, and state, or societal ethics). (See, e.g., Bobbio 1987; Sartori 1987; Dahl 1989) These “separations” help to preserve the state’s crucial impartiality and recognized legitimacy in its conflict management and allocative functions, making it more effective in its proactive role as primary agent of society and societal interests. The rule-of-law regime can be identified by its adherence and promotion of such norms as the professionalization of the military (i.e., the primary instrumental violence capability of the state is institutionally and legitimately restrained from involvement in issues of conflict management) and legal constraints on the use of excessive force, brutality, or other abuses of coercive authority in police procedures (i.e., strict attention to civil rights and human rights, especially of minorities; Sartori 1987). The principle of non-coercive conflict management and non-use of force is also gaining prominence in conventions of inter-group behavior (i.e., international law: see e.g., Arend and Beck 1993 and Reisman and Antoniou 1994 on international law and the inter-state use of force; see e.g., Damrosch 1993, McCoubrey and
White 1995, and Meron 1995 on international law as regards intra-state uses of force). The inferred principle of non-offensive security in inter-group relations is clearly articulated in the ideas of “reasonable suffic-

iently” (Zhurkin et al. 1987), a policy of non-provocative defense adopted by the Gorbachev regime in the (former) Soviet Union. It must be emphasized that the use of force as an instrumental expedient in conflict management is extremely problematic. The only such use that is wholly consistent with the social forms model of society is its use to neutralize an existing use of force.

26. A great philosophical debate between assimilationists and accommodationists in political integration theory raged among European socialists in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Lenin, an avowed accommodationist, held sway in the formulation of Soviet “nationality policy.” The resulting rift between Soviet (Leninist) and Western orthodoxy in political integration theory became one of the most salient, defining features of their political differences in the 20th century. The rift between Stalinist and Leninist nationalities policy is equally salient in the definition of domestic politics in the Soviet Union. (Marshall 1990) More recently, the attempt to politically integrate the several states of the European Community into the European Union is an example of the accommodationist approach. The recent failures of the Soviet system are equally informative of the dynamics of political integration. A success may be noted in the relative lack of violence involved in the failure of the Soviet system and the “safety net” feature of the diversity approach. (Marshall 1993)

27. Important in this regard is a distinct between endoethnym and exoethnym. An individual’s endoethnym refers to the group(s) with which that individual identifies itself. An exoethnym refers to a group identification that others impose upon the individual and use to define their relationship with that individual. See Bromlei 1984.

28. A temporal qualification is necessary. Reactive behavior is sometimes muted or misdirected and this is most often a function of collective ignorance or lack of organizational resources. This situation enables a temporary condition of net social benefit (similar to an austerity economy but resulting in the absolute aggrandizement of the Active privileged sector at the relative expense of the Reactive sector) either because the Reactive sector believes the inequitable societal arrangement, and their own inferior position, to be somehow ordained as just or immutable, or because the Reactive sector failed to identify the source of the perceived injustice or consequential frustration. Thus, “false consciousness” and the lack of consciousness both contribute to muting oppositional behavior; Active behavior is accepted or inadequately and inappropriately countered. This, of course, was Marx’s perspective, the basis for his criticism of religion as the “opiate of the masses,” and his rationale for “raising the consciousness of the proletariat” in opposition to the bourgeoisie.

29. One strategy for overcoming the limitations of collective violence on systemic development is for the Proactive sector to dissociate from the opposing factions, thereby removing its own development potential from the net-consuming social system. This has proven to be a marginally successful strategy as the opposing sectors are more likely to engage in open warfare without the moderating influence of the Proactive sector and will soon thus consume their diminished resources and look around for easier prey. If the Proactive sector couples this strategy with an instrumental buildup of its own, it may protect its potential at minimal cost from the war-diminished instrumental capacities of the opposing factions (i.e., establish “islands” of development). A similar but much more effective strategy has been for the Proactive sector to ally with the more moderate Active
sector whose behavior it can then control by progressively co-opting Active and Reactive elements while using controlled, moderate coercion in conjunction with socialization processes to deflate the more extreme behaviors, that is, to pull in the extremes.

30. “Successful” conflict resolution refers to dispute solutions that are mutually acceptable and can be administratively managed in the future according to the terms of a multilateral agreement including all parties to the conflict. An “unsuccessful” resolution will be imposed unilaterally through the agency of superior force by one side in the dispute and will require a continual application of instrumental coercion to maintain the outcome and stabilize the relationship in the future. Unsuccessful conflict resolutions are likely to flare into conflict once again if the instrumental conditions shift to favor the reactive party; unilateral solutions tend to reinforce conflict grievances, complicate them by the added grievance of unequal terms and status, and cause them to persist.

31. See Most and Starr (1989) for additional clarification and further explanation of the “opportunity-willingness” conceptual framework.

32. Of course, how it guarantees its security is the critical issue in the next developmental phase. If it guarantees its own security instrumentally (i.e., by force of arms) it severely limits its developmental (integrative) potential and thus inhibits the prospects of other groups (i.e., the security dilemma); if its security is guaranteed multilaterally through the auspices of the greater political interactive system, unit emphasis on instrumental strategies is lessened and political integration is facilitated.

33. Plotted accurately, the smooth curves would appear more as two jagged lines fluctuating (or cycling) in tandem (between order and disorder, see above) and with smoothing (decreasing) amplitude but whose basic tendencies approximate the curvilinear function presented here.